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STYLE AND SKEPTICISM IN THE PATH OF TRE LAW
John C.P. Goldberg
INTRODUCTION

As Neil Duxbury notes, Holmes consistently provokes
strong reactions in his readers.1 The substance of those reactions, however, is notably inconsistent. Some tend toward the
view that Holmes is an empty vessel; a font of legal aphorisms
for every occasion.2 Others find Holmes to have advocated a
bleak and noxious account of law that equates right with
might.3 Still others seem to believe both.4 This panel on the
European reception of The Path of the Law' contains representatives of the first two positions. Dr. Duxbury argues that the
success of Holmes's essay is proof that Holmes's significance
owes less to the content and coherence of his ideas than to the
stylish and suggestive manner in which he expressed them. In
contrast, Professor Dyzenhaus reads the essay as advancing a
comprehensive political theory that endorses an amoral and
deeply cynical account of law and adjudication.6

" ©1997 John C.P. Goldberg. All Rights Reserved.
t Assistant Professor, Vanderbilt University School of Law. Thans for many
helpful comments to Bob Brauneis, Rebecca Brown, David Dyzenhaus, Neil
Duxbury, Julie Faber, Barry Friedman, Homer Goldberg, Tom Grey, Martin
Loughlin, David Partlett, Richard Posner, Bob Rasmussen, Tony Sebok, Nick
Zeppos and Ben Zipursky. Remaining errors are mine.
1 Neil Duxbury, When Trying is Failing:Holmes's "Englishness," 63 BROOK. L.
REV. 145 (1997).
1 I hear this judgment most frequently from members of the legal academy
not devoted to the arcane world of legal theory. Some theorists have said as much
in print. See, e.g., Saul Touster, Holmes a Hundred Years Ago: The Common Law
and Legal Theory, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 673, 707 (1982).
2 Ben W. Palmer, Hobbes, Holmes and Hitler, 31 A.B.A. J. 569, 571 (1945).
' GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 49-50, 56 (1977) (Holmes propounded "highly ambiguous" yet "radical and despairing" account of law as forcible
imposition of majority will).
5 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of Law, 10 HARe. L REV. 457 (1897)
[hereinafter Holmes, Path].
6 David Dyzenhaus, Holmes and Carl Schmitt. An Unlik~ely Pair?, 63 BROOK.
L. REV. 165 (1997).
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Speaking in broad terms, there is another quite different
scholarly take on Holmes--one evidenced on this panel by
Professor Twining and in the papers of other conferees, including Judge Posner and Professor Grey. These interpreters maintain that, when handled with sufficient care, Holmes's rhetoric
reveals a nuanced liberal theory of law and adjudication. Professor Twining, a representative of this "camp," insists, for
example, that Holmes has been done a disservice by those who
mistake the "bad man" for the hero of The Path of the Law,
when in fact it represents only one aspect of Holmes's vision.'
As is perhaps already evident from the foregoing, I am
sympathetic to the views of the latter group, and this article
aims to promote their cause by taking issue with Duxbury
and
Dyzenhaus.' Part I attempts to rebut Duxbury's argument
that Holmes's legacy can be r6duced to a notion of style divorced from substance. Part 1H maintains that Dyzenhaus errs
in contending that Holmes's commitment to a version of legal
positivism led him to endorse a cynical, statist account of law
and a passive theory of judging. This contention, I argue, is
mistaken both as a conceptual argument about legal positivism
and as a descriptive claim about The Path of the Law. Part II
concludes by offering evidence in support of the claim that
Holmes's theories of law and adjudication are best described as
a relatively moderate and liberal form of positivism.

I. HOLMES'S INTELLECTUAL LEGACY: DuXBURY ON STYLE
Neil Duxbury argues that Holmes's continuing influence as
a legal theorist owes in part to his command of written English. Although this claim is in one sense uncontroversial, I will
attempt to show first, that Duxbury has underestimated the
difficulty of producing a satisfactory account of style, and second, that one finds within his seemingly unobjectionable thesis
an insistent challenge to Holmes's place in the history of American jurisprudence. I conclude that this critique may owe more

" William Twining, Other People's Power: Holmes, The Bad Man and English
Positivism, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 189 (1997).
8 Because there is considerably less distance between Professor Twining's paper and my own-indeed our two papers could be read as offering complementary

accounts of Holmes as a moderate skeptic-I have structured this article around
my conference commentary on the Duxbury and Dyzenhaus 'papers.
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to Duxbury's assessment of the jurisprudence of Holmes's era,
or to Duxbury's approach to intellectual history, than to his
holding a low opinion of Holmes.
A- Holmes's "English"Style
Duxbury seeks an explanation for the success of The Path
of Law, and of Holmes's academic writings generally, and finds
that it lies in Holmes's combination of American ambition and
English style. As to ambition, Holmes provides an early instance of "American" scholarly brazenness by attempting to
frame and answer very large and abstract legal questions 9 In
style, however, Holmes could not be more removed from modern American academia: his grand claims are made in prose
that is noticeably free of jargon, prolixity, and footnotes. In
this regard, according to Duxbury, Holmes is quite "English."10
Duxbury attempts to refine the notion of English style by
breaking it down into its component characteristics, describing
it as "undemonstrative, unempathetic, casual, insouciant even";
as well as "harsh, scandalous, aloof, unfashionable, cryptic,
fatalistic and self-contradictory, and yet also perceptive, challenging, inspired and inspiring."" The gist of these descriptions is that Holmes wrote in a manner which, by the standards of his time and today, is more literary and less technical
than typical academic writing. Unlike the average professor,
Holmes was willing to employ ordinary, albeit provocative,
vocabulary, short sentences with relatively few qualifying adjectives and clauses, and a loose, nonlinear organization. He
was thus willing to tolerate the appearance of imprecision and
even self-contradiction in order to obtain maximum rhetorical
effect.
Thus defined, Holmes's Englishness is exemplified by The
Path of the Law. The essay is short, purporting to defend ambitious theoretical claims about law in the space of twenty pages.

' Duxbury, supra note 1, at 147-48 (describing American theorists' ambition). I
take it that this is why Duxbury asserts that the English "probably could never
produce" a jurist such as Holmes. Duxbury, supra note 1, at 150.
10 Duxhury, supra note 1, at 163.
n Duxbury, supra note 1, at 152.
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It is also, at least by modern law review standards, loosely
organized (it lacks headings) and entirely unsupported, featuring all of six (not very informative) footnotes. The essay is
filled with delphic phrases, including what Duxbury nicely describes as its "Taoistic" title.12 It also tends to make points by
way of illustration and allusion, rather than extended argument. For example, the conceptual separation of law from
morality is expressed through the device of the imagined "bad
man."3 Likewise, the notion of anti-formalist legal methodology is conveyed through a cryptic reference to the jurist of the
future as "the man of statistics and the master of economics." 4
B. Style as CausalAgent
"English" may not be the best name for the prose style just
described. It is, after all, clearly not the only style favored by
leading English legal scholars-consider, for example,
Bentham, or H.L.A. Hart. Moreover, there are American writers who display mastery of this style, including Holmes and
Cardozo. Perhaps a more accurate name would be the "classical" style, denoting the style characteristic of the classically
trained, nineteenth and early twentieth century "Man of Letters--that species of amateur, generalist intellectual which
predated the professional academy and its specialized, technical discourses.
Labeling quibbles aside, Duxbury surely is correct that the
style of The Path of the Law appears to the modern academic
eye to be literary and casual. Still, we are left with important
questions. How does the casual style of Holmes's work explain
its lasting impact? Why has it not had the opposite effect of
rendering Holmes's scholarship academically suspect?
Duxbury's explanation of the causal power of casual style is, at
this critical juncture, quite underdeveloped."5 Nevertheless, I
12 Duxbury, supra note 1, at 156.

"

Holmes, Path, supra note 5, at 459.
Holmes, Path, supra note 5, at 469.

' Duxbury is content to rely on off-the-cuff notions about style, as am I. It
would undoubtedly behoove us both to learn something more about the subject. A

good, if perhaps dated, introductory source may be the elegant and informative
'style" entry in PORTER W. PERRIN, WRITER's GUIDE AND INDEX TO ENGLISH 716-
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believe one finds in his analysis two claims. The first is that
the causal efficacy of style is fundamentally un-intellectual-that style operates at an emotional, sub-conscious, or aesthetic level, engaging the sensibilities, not the sense, of its
reader. The second is that Holmes had a good "feel" for the
sensibilities of the academy.
Holmes moved in the intellectual circles of Boston, and he
later became an active participant in "high-society London
intellectual life." 6 Out of these experiences, Duxbury suggests, Holmes developed an appreciation for intellectuals'
tastes and a knack for communicating with an elite audience.
In particular, he came to appreciate that certain styles of writing were likely to be effective because they played to this
audience's conception of themselves as astute and sophisticated. The English style, by virtue of its simple, elliptical prose,
"assum[es] an educated audience.., which does not need, and
would not especially welcome, having too much spelled out to
them." 7 In other words, intellectuals are drawn to the English style because it implicitly affirms their own account of who
they are, or whom they aspire to be; it "makes us feel, as it
were, complimented." 8 Attuned to this psychological and aesthetic fact, Holmes chose to convey his ideas in stylized and
somewhat disorganized prose, knowing (if only tacitly) that, in
so doing, he would draw in his audience by implicitly crediting
them with the ability to perform for themselves any necessary
refinement and elaboration.
According to Duxbury, this same shrewd sense of style
explains in part why The Path of the Law continues to resonate with legal academics a century after its initial delivery.
Indeed, the essay can only have a greater resonance today
because it stands out as a striking departure from the stiff;
earnest, and overbearing professorial style of the modern law
review article. To the American law professor, the essay is a
scholarly indulgence-"reading [it] must be rather like taking a
holiday and being able to call it work." '

24 (3d ed. 1959).
16 Duxbury, supra note 1, at 154.
"
18

Duxbury, supra note 1, at 158.
Duxhury, supra note 1, at 159 (emphasis added).

19

Duxbury, supra note 1, at 163.
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Duxbury's analysis thus boils down to the plausible proposition that Holmes's feel for the aesthetic sensibilities of his
audience constitutes one among several factors-including,
presumably, the content of the essay and the reputation of its
author-that explains the continued influence of The Path of
the Law.20 Yet the reasonableness of Duxbury's conclusion
should not blind us to certain difficulties in his position.
Consider first the distinction between style and substance,
defined as the merits or validity of the thoughts being expressed. For certain purposes, it is fairly easy to distinguish
between the two. For example, Judge Posner has argued that
the noxiousness of the substance of Holmes's notorious epigram in Buck v. Bell ("Three generations of imbeciles are
enough.") can neatly be separated from its rhetorical virtues.21
Even granting this distinction, it does not follow that one can
so easily attribute causal efficacy to style independent of substance. Suppose the vast bulk of Holmes's opinions expressed
values as discordant with our own as those of Buck. Or suppose Holmes's writings were filled with the following epigrams,
along with consistent supporting text: "The law pays tribute
not to experience but to logic"; "It is revolting to have no better
reason for rejecting a rule of law than that it was laid down in
the time of Henry IV"; "For the rational study of law the blackletter man is the man of the present, but the man of the future
is the man of biology and the master of eugenics."" Perhaps
these are stylistically inferior to their actual Holmesian counterparts. If they are not, to the extent we find them unappealing, we do so because they fail on the merits. The same point
may be made in the reverse: are not academics inclined to
award "style points" to The Path of the Law because the style
vividly conveys substance?
Matters only get more complicated when we attempt to
distinguish the force of Holmesian style from the force of what
might be called Holmesian intellect-his rhetorical skills from
20 See Duxbury, supra note 1, at 163 (Holmes's style of expression is "one of
the many reasons for Holmes's influence").
21 Richard A.

Posner, Introduction, to THE ESSENTIAL HOLMES: SELECTIONS

FRoM THE LETTERS, SPEECHES, JUDICIAL OPINIONS, AND OTHER WRITINGS OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLmES, JR., at xvi-xvii (Richard A. Posner ed., 1992) (discussing

Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927)).
' G. Edward White raised an example similar to these during the conference.
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his analytic ability." Recall that, on Duxbury's account, style
functions as a causal agent by virtue of the psychological
make-up and aesthetic sensibilities of its audience: The Path of
the Law is a success because Holmes wrote about law in a
style that legal academics find agreeable. But does not style
operate at the level of intellect? Again, suppose we can agree
with Posner that Holmes's Buck v. Bell opinion adopts good
literary form in the service of bad ends. Are we also prepared
to say that its rhetorical force in advancing those ends is distinct from the conceptual mastery conveyed by Holmes's felicity
of expression? While Duxbury sees in Holmes's style only rhetorical skill-a talent for enamoring an audience-one could
argue that Holmesian style equally serves to demonstrate
intellectual dexterity, thereby fostering in his audience the
belief that engagement with the text will be intellectually
rewarding. Indeed, the virtues of The Path of the Law both as
a teaching tool and as scholarship would seem to lie not merely
in its employment of literary devices like the "bad man," but in
its successful use of such devices to illuminate, explain and
analyze (rather than simply to signal, recite or allude to)2
complex and abstract propositions, such as the proposition that
law is distinct from morality. Holmes's superb written style
thus provides evidence of a superb and subtle mind.
Finally, even if we could separate the style of The Path of
the Law from its substance and intelligence, Duxbury's explanation for the essay's success faces an additional hurdle: the
essay was not written in a vacuum. It followed years of scholarly research into the histories of Roman, German and Anglo-

I mean "analytic ability" to suggest both the "technical" capacity for careful,
rigorous, logical analysis and the less technical "feel" for making arguments that
are not only logical, but appropriate and astute.
"4Duxbury credits Holmes for his "wonderfully allusive, but not explanatory"
statements in The Path of the Law concerning the importance for law of the study
of economics. Duxhury, supra note 1, at 160. I agree with Duxbury that these passages do not come close to providing a systematic account of law and economics-how could one passage, paragraph or article?-but they do not strike me as
ever having been intended to found a sub-discipline within the academic study of
law. Rather, the talk of economics and statistics is Holmes's (stylish) way of emphasizing that, since, many legal decisions ultimately cannot be divorced from
judgments about conflicting social and political goals, lawyers faced with the task
of making those judgments ought not simply rely on legalisms or their amateur
instincts, but should instead attempt to inform themselves as much as possible
about the desirability and attainability of those goals.
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American law, which culminated in the publication of The
Common Law. While portions of that book, particularly its
famous opening paragraphs, are written in the "English" style,
much of it consists of plodding, dry, turgid, relatively well-supported, and sometimes quite ingenious historical and doctrinal
analysis.' Before one can attribute causal significance to the
style of The Path of the Law, one must consider and discount
the effects of this earlier, often unstylish work. Is it not plausible that the later essay would not have been a success without
the earlier unstylish work serving to vouch for Holmes's scholarly bona fides?26
These objections hardly defeat Duxbury's ultimately uncontestable claim that Holmes's written style has figured in
the continued impact of his writings. Nevertheless, they do
bring into question his implicit claim that style operates purely
at an aesthetic or subconscious level. And if style contains an
intellectual component, then one cannot pass judgment on
Holmesian style without passing judgment on the merits of
Holmesian thought.
C. Duxbury's Quiet Indictment of Holmes
1. Diamonds and String
How, then, does Duxbury's account of Holmes's style fit
into an evaluation of the substance of Holmes's work? Any
account of a writer that isolates his style can appear, merely
by the choice of focus, to denigrate that substance. Duxbury,
however, takes pains to avoid this negative implication. He
sometimes credits Holmes with intelligence and acuity. 7
More frequently he affects agnosticism as, for example, when
he refuses to say whether Holmes deserves credit for the conSee MORTON J. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 18701960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 110 (1992) (The Common Law "meets

several tests for a classic-it is obscure and inaccessible, in addition to being rarely read.").
26 It seems to me that we are more prepared to take seriously
the views of
someone departing from mainstream professional conventions if he or she at some
point displays mastery of those conventions which she rejects. For example, we
take Richard Rorty's literary anti-philosophy seriously because he came to that
view only after a significant engagement with analytic philosophy.
" Duxbury, supra note 1, at 161.

STYLE AND SKEPTICISM

1997]

scious use of effective style, or whether the English style is
superior or inferior to the styles which others have employed.' These disclaimers notwithstanding, I believe that
Duxbury's analysis of Holmes the stylist actually contains a
quiet but relatively strong critique of Holmes the jurist.
This point may be illustrated by contrasting passages
written by Judge Posner and Duxbury. First Posner:
It is natural to suppose that Holmes's place in history depends on
the magnitude, soundness, and durability of his contribution to law
and thinking about law. Perhaps it does, but this volume has been
constructed on a different premise; that Holmes's true greatness is
not as a lawyer, judge, or legal theorist in a narrowly professional
sense of these words, but as a writer and, in a loose sense that I
shall try to make clear, as a philosopher-in fact as a 'writer-philosopher"; and that his distinction as a lawyer, judge, and legal theorist
lies precisely in the infusion of literary skill and philosophical insight into his legal work.
. . . [Tihe variety of intellectual influences that played upon

Holmes's subtle and receptive intellect, together with his power of
articulation and the daring with which he brought his intellectual
storehouse and rhetorical imagination to bear on his professional
tasks, makes Holmes a central figure in the intellectual history of
this nation, and one who deserves to be more widely and appreciatively read than he is."'

Now Duxbury:
[Tihis apparent lack of planning [in Holmes's writing] is more often
responsible for generating the impression that his writing is inspired
rather than derivative (even when it is derivative)."
*

.

. Holmes's literary style was certainly different from anything

that we encounter in contemporary legal writing. But my claim is
merely that we are attracted to that difference, not that Holmes was
a better legal writer than are any of our contemporaries. What
mainly survives of Holmes, above and beyond his literary style, is
his capacity to inspire and impassion. Whatever their other faults,
even the worst studies of his accomplishments tend not to be routine

Duxbury, supra note 1, at 159-63.
Posner, supra note 21, at xvi.
Posner, supra note 21, at m.
31 Duxbury, supra note 1, at 152.
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or unengaged. If, as Flaubert remarked, there rests within every
lawyer the debris of a poet, Holmes 3has
without doubt instigated the
2
recovery of some fascinating debris.

Posner, as much as Duxbury, wishes to attribute Holmes's
success in part to his "literary skill." But for Posner, who is
obviously an enthusiast, Holmes's style is a feature of his intelligence. Posner's Holmes self-consciously employs his literary
powers to organize and communicate profound insights. Hence,
he is a jurist who deserves to be read. Duxbury's Holmes perhaps also ought to be read, but for different reasons, reasons
which suggest that Duxbury is not an enthusiast of Holmes.
For Duxbury, Holmes's greatest virtue is that he had the good
taste to adopt the English style.33 The value in The Path of
the Law thus resides chiefly in its provision of a literary escape
from the tedium of academic legal writing. True, it provides
inspiration, but even that seems to owe more to its vagueness
than to Holmes's profundity. Thus, "[wihat mainly survives of
Holmes, above and beyond his literary style, is his capacity to
inspire and impassion."s' The Path of the Law ultimately provides not insight, but an occasion for insight; a stimulant
which causes readers to recover, apparently from within themselves, "some fascinating debris."3
One thus does not have to dig very far beneath the surface
of Duxbury's paper-particularly when it is read in conjunction
with his treatment of Holmes in Patterns of American Jurisprudence3 6 -to find a fairly strong critique. In tracing the development of American legal thought, the latter work gives
Holmes a very modest role: he appears as a transitional figure
with one foot in the era of legal formalism and the other in the

Duxbury, supra note 1, at 164 (footnote omitted).
Duxbury is not quite prepared to credit Holmes with being a master rhetorician; he holds out the possibility that Holmes merely adopted the English style by
imitation or intuition, rather than conscious choice. Duxbury, supra note 1, at 154.
" Duxbury, supra note 1, at 164.
Discussing the opening arguments of The Path of the Law, Duxbury concludes: "There seems, in fact, to be not all that much substance to what Holmes
is saying here; but then it is so often the case that the effectiveness of his observations rests not so much in what he says as how he says it." Duxbury, supra
note 1, at 158.
21NEIL DuxBURy, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 32-46 (1995) [herein.
32
's

after DuXBURY, PATrERNS].
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post-formalist world of legal realism.' That he combined
these and other opposing tendencies in American and European legal thought, moreover, is not taken as a sign of dialectical
or synthetic aptitude. Rather it is symptomatic of the fact that
Holmes was "a passionate reader and dilettante," rather than a
"professional academic."' Indeed, this Holmes is described as
an undiscriminating amateur, a "polyglot" who collected various strands of late nineteenth century thought, including German historicism, philosophical pragmatism, Langdellianism,
social Darwinism, and political liberalism.' By virtue of his
deft writing, he managed to turn this incoherent assemblage
into an attractive and influential body of work, but this only
earns Holmes the title, "the master of ambiguity," a dubious
honor previously conferred on Holmes by Grant Gilmore, one of
Holmes's harshest critics. 0
In Duxbury's writings on Holmes one thus hears more
than a faint echo of H.L.A. Hart's review of The Common
Law,4 which Hart subsequently reprinted with the title Diamonds and String: Holmes on the Common Law.42 Hart, too,
praised "the magic and sonority of [Holmes's] style.' And,
although prepared to credit Holmes with insights into legal
history, Hart cautioned that The Common Law should not be
read as a serious work of legal theory. In Hart's eyes, Holmes's
attempts at philosophy were "shallow," his reasoning "obscure
and hasty," and thus the book had theoretical value mainly as
a "stimulant.""
Duxbury, largely reiterating Hart, finds Holmes's work to
be of interest, if at all, for its occasional inspirational "diamonds." But his criticism is perhaps even more severe than
Harts. For, in Duxbury's view, there may not be any real

DUXBURY, PATrERNS, supra note 36, at 32.
DUXBURY, PATIERNS, supra note 36, at 33.
DUXBURY, PATTERNS, supra note 36, at 34-35, 41-44, 46.
DuxBURY, PATTERNS, supra note 36, at 64; see also GILMORE, supra note 4,
at 56.
"' H.LA Hart, Holmes's Common Law, 1 N.Y. REV. BOOKS 15 (1963).
HLHA HART, ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY 278 (1983) [hereinafter HART, ESSAYS].
HART, ESSAYS, supra note 42, at 278, 285.

" HART, ESSAYS, supra note 42, at 278.
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"diamonds" in the essay, only paste. Whatever insights can
be found within it seem to belong not to Holmes, but to his
readers."
2. Duxbury on Legal History
Reading between (and outside) the lines, I thus find within
Duxbury's account of Holmesian style a forceful indictment.
This treatment may strike Duxbury as tendentious, and perhaps it is. Certainly it is not consonant with the generally
benign tone of his paper. This disparity between tone and
content poses a final interpretive problem: how to square
Duxbury's facially neutral disposition with what I have described as his strong critique of Holmes's jurisprudence.
In fact, I think they can be reconciled. As I will try to
establish now, Duxbury's dissatisfaction with Holmes probably
does not stem from the presence of defects unique to Holmes.
Rather, it is likely part of a more general critical disposition
toward the scholarly method Holmes employed, toward the
jurisprudence of the Progressive era, or perhaps even toward
the very enterprise of jurisprudence. Duxbury's critique of
Holmes is not pointed because it is not intended to single him
out: Holmes's flaws are merely those of a particular scholarly
approach, a generation, or perhaps even an entire intellectual
discipline.
That Duxbury conveys his critique of Holmes in an agnostic tone may indicate that, despite his appreciation of the virtues of English style, he is somewhat less enamored of it-or
at least the mode of analysis with which it is associated-than
he lets on. As we have seen, Duxbury locates the beauty and
power of the English style in its acceptance of incompleteness;
it lacks the earnest and tedious style of the turgid scholarly
article that is determined to dot every T and cross every 't'.
However, the English style and the English stylist are equally
subject to a charitable and a not-so-charitable interpretation.
Charitably described, the English stylist is like Posner's
Holmes, the writer who is fully capable of drawing all the
salient distinctions and connections, but, who for the sake of
rhetorical efficacy, elects not to.4 Uncharitably described, he
"

See supra text accompanying notes 33-35.
Duxbury, supra note 1, at 161-162 (attributing to Holmes acuity and a rela-
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is the Holmes that sometimes appears in Duxbury's book and
paper, the "dilettante" whose manner of explanation and analysis substitutes linguistic elegance and ambiguity for rigor and
precision.4' It may be that Duxbury believes that other writers who have employed the English style are entitled to the
charitable description even if Holmes is not. Alternatively,
Duxbury's analysis may belie his distrust of "sof nineteenth
and early twentieth century scholarship, scholarship which evidences classical, rather than economic or analytical, training.
If so, we should not be surprised to find a strong critique of
Holmes's thought within Duxbury's nominally agnostic account; Holmes is vulnerable to such criticism merely because
he wrote in an age of a prescientific scholarship.
A similar explanation may derive from Duxbury's relatively low opinion of the jurisprudence of the American Progressive
era running from, say, Holmes through Cardozo. Duxbury, like
many modem historians, tends to regard this era as the awkward teen years of American legal intellectual history-the
period in which theorists began to abandon the childish faith of
formalism, yet had not fully embraced the adult, realist notion
of law as inherently unstable and political." Needless to say,
this characterization generates a certain unwillingness to take
theorists like Holmes, Pound and Cardozo seriously. They are
tively self-conscious use of understatement).
'4 Duxbury, supra note 1, at 158 (Holmes's style often crumbles under scrutiny).
4n See DUXBURY, PATTERNS, supra note
36, at 46 (Holmes a "convenient inroad'
supra
note
36, at 64 (no coherent anti-formalist
PATTERNS,
to realism); DUXBURY,
philosophy emerged in Progressive period). For a variation on this assessment, see
HoRwrrz, supra note 25, at 109-43, 189-92 (describing Holmes and Cardozo as
transitional figures in American legal history). In my view, the standard division
of the history of modern American Jurisprudence into three parts-formalism,
realism and postrealism-needs rethinking. It is clumsy (because it washes over
important distinctions and similarities between eras and theories) and possibly
biased (by making realism the watershed moment in American legal history, it
privileges utilitarian and skeptical theories of law by rendering them as the default position in jurisprudence).
Professor Grey's excellent review of Patternsof American Jurisprudence (which
I came across while this paper was in draft) notes this feature of Duxburys book
and takes issue with it. See Thomas C. Grey, Modem American Legal Thought,
106 YALE L.J. 493, 514-17 (1996). Professor White has partly resisted the intellectual-historical orthodoxy by identifying some of the salient differences between
Progressive era and realist jurisprudence. See G. Edward White, From Sociological
Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in Early TwentiethCentury America, 58 VA. L. REv. 999 (1972).
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instead examined for signs of latent realism. Here again, to the
extent Duxbury sees in Holmes the defects of a scholarly generation, he has no occasion to single him out for sharp rebuke.
Finally, there may be one other aspect to Duxbury's rendition which explains his nominally agnostic, yet critical attitude
towards Holmes. The clue that leads to this alternative account is found in Duxbury's description of Holmes as a theorist
who pulled together several strands of late nineteenth century
thought. From this depiction of Holmes as a gatherer of ideas
floating about in his epoch, one can detect a particular account
of intellectual history-one which combines a notion of ideas as
independently existing phenomena with a picture of history
modeled on Wittgenstein's rope, which consists of many
strands, none of which runs its full length.49 According to this
model, the great figures in the history of ideas are those who
manage to take a set of conceptual strands that are in some
sense already "in the world," and to form a distinct, eye-catching pattern of rope. (Imagine that each strand is a particular
color, and that the great figures succeed in weaving a striking
pattern.) Holmes fits this description because he managed to
conjoin pragmatism, Darwinism, liberalism and other ideas
that had struck a chord with late nineteenth century audiences. The next generation of legal theorists likewise picked up
some of these strands, added some new ones, and spun together a new, but equally loosely constructed, segment of conceptual rope that came to be identified as "legal realism."
This reconstruction of Duxbury's approach to intellectual
history, although admittedly a stretch, 0 would permit the
reconciliation of Duxbury's skepticism about the substance of
Holmes's ideas with the agnostic tone of his paper. If Duxbury
is not much of a Holmes enthusiast, this may be only because
he does not think that an intellectual historian should be an

" LUDWIG

WITIGENSTEIN,

Anscombe trans., 1958).

PHILOSOPHICAL

INVESTIGATIONS

50 But not a preposterous stretch. See DUXBURY,

§

67

(G.E.M.

PATERNS, supra note 36, at

2-3 ("Jurisprudential ideas are rarely born; equally rarely do they die ....
Ideas-along with values, attitudes and beliefs-tend .to emerge and decline, and
sometimes they are revived and refined."). For a brief description and defense of a
version of this view of intellectual history, see G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN
AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY at ix-xii (1985).
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enthusiast of any theorist.5 ' If intellectual history is nothing
more than an endless rope in which some strands are added,
some picked up and others dropped, the fact that Holmes's
collection of ideas was not original, profound, coherent or true
does not tarnish his reputation. These criteria are in some
sense irrelevant. Moreover, we can find in this understanding
of history a ready explanation for Duxbury's interest in
Holmes's style. If any given theorist's historical significance
consists of the causal efficacy of his or her ideas, the historian
should be interested in knowing what it is that renders particular combinations of ideas efficacious. Style emerges as a candidate for the role of an historical-causal agent. By describing
Holmes as a stylist, Duxbury can explain Holmes's impact in

terms of his ability to weave an eye-catching segment of
rope.5"
If these speculations about Duxbury's historical method
can be borne out--or if the preceding claims about Duxbury's

attitude toward classical scholarship or Progressive era jurisprudence are warranted-then it would not be accurate simply
to label Duxbury a critic of Holmes. He is no more a critic of

Holmes than of any other theorist of Holmes's era, or perhaps
any era. But even if Duxbury does not denigrate Holmes, he

should not be mistaken for an admirer. For Duxbury, Holmes
remains simply the stylist, "the master of ambiguity." ' I have

5 Grey, supra note 48, at 511-12 makes a similar observation.
52 One finds a very different type of intellectual history in Holmes's own work.
Perhaps the easiest way to illustrate the contrast is to compare the attitude with
which Holmes approached the objects of his study with the attitude of a historian
who has embraced the theory of history that I have ascribed to Duxbury. One
cannot help but imagine the latter to be engrossed, yet utterly detached, even
mildly amused, with the task of charting the busy, but ultimately futile work of
each successive generation of theory-weavers. While Holmes himself has been famously accused of "Olympian" detachment, his detachment-which, like that of the
historian I have described, no doubt derives from a conviction that history has
demonstrated the ultimate transience of civilizations and, with them, ideas--was in
one respect considerably less extreme. Holmes, after all, did not merely locate
theorists within a historical stream of theories. Whether dealing with Kant's ethics, the Roman account of property, or ancient Teutonic rules for liability of
bailees, Holmes sought both to trace the origins and influence of these ideas and
to engage them; to challenge their validity on their premises and his. My posited
historian, by contrast, refuses fully to engage theorists such as Holmes, because
she treats them like historical way stations-as vessels temporarily housing assemblages of ideas.
DUXBURY, PATrFRNS, supra note 36, at 64.
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tried to suggest why this cannot be the case-why style devoid
of substance cannot explain our continued interest in him.
What remains for consideration is the nature of Holmes's substantive vision.
II. HOLMES AS THE "BAD MAN": DYZENHAUS ON POSITIVISM
AND MORAL SKEPTICISM

In pairing Holmes with Carl Schmitt, a German philosopher with Nazi sympathies, Professor Dyzenhaus revives a
criticism that has dogged Holmes's reputation at least since
Ben Palmer's 1945 tirade, Hobbes, Holmes and Hitler." The
claim is that Holmes embraced an amoral and deeply skeptical
55
positivism that reduces law to "the gunman . .. writ large,"
and thus sanctions as legitimate even the most wicked political
and legal regimes.
Although directed in this instance at Holmes, Dyzenhaus's
attack is part of an ongoing critical engagement with legal
positivism. As an aid to understanding his present critique of
Holmes and his broader critique of positivism, this Part will
attempt to situate the former within the latter. Part II.A provides a brief, background exegesis of the longstanding debate
over whether legal positivism generates theories of law that
are defective because they entail theories of adjudication that
require judges to uphold and enforce wicked laws. Part II.B
explores Dyzenhaus's entry into that debate on behalf of the
antipositivist position in his book, Hard Cases in Wicked Legal
Systems.5 6 Part II.C explains how the critique of Schmitt and
Holmes provided in Dyzenhaus's conference paper signals a
significant modification of his anti-positivism in that he appears no longer to condemn legal positivism per se, and instead
finds wanting only a particular form of legal positivism deriving from a strong form of moral skepticism. Towards the end of
Part II.C, I argue that this modification amounts to a concession that there is no necessary or analytic connection between

Palmer, supra note 3.
H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV.L.
REV. 593, 603 (1958) [hereinafter Hart, Positivism].
"

'

16DAVID DYZENHAUS, HARD CASES IN WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMs: SOUTH AFRICAN

LAW IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF LEGAL PHILOSOPHY (1991) [hereinafter DYZENHAUS,
WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS].
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either legal positivism or moral skepticism on the one hand,
and a statist conception of law and adjudication on the other,
and thus to a concession that there is no a priori reason to
believe that, because a theorist such as Holmes is a moral
skeptic and a legal positivist, he is also committed to a complacent, statist judiciary. Finally, part H.D returns the focus to
Holmes by arguing that Dyzenhaus misattributes such a commitment to The Path of the Law when in fact it-like The
Common Law-offers a modestly skeptical, politically moderate
account of law that leaves a significant role for moral norms in
law and adjudication.
A. Legal Positivism and The JudicialFunction
1. Positivism and The Moral Argument for the Separation
Thesis
"Legal positivism" has long resisted precise definition;'
nevertheless, most would ascribe to it at least the following
two related propositions. First, legal positivism holds that
"law" (in contrast to custom or private commands) is the body
of rules or norms promulgated by those offices or institutions
conventionally recognized by the citizenry of a given society, or
its officials, as the maker of authoritative, binding norms and
rules. Positivists have often referred to these offices and institutions as "the sovereign." Second, it holds that since law is
always the product of the acts of historically contingent sovereign institutions, there is no guarantee that any given law or
legal system will maximize utility, respect natural rights, or
otherwise conform to principles of morality or justice. 3
Historically, the first positivist proposition about the
sources of law was offered as a response to, and as a critique
of, theories of common law which held that judges, by means of
a skill only they possess (legal reasoning), find law in the customs and traditions of the citizenry. Thus driven by the con-

See Stephen P. Perry, The Varieties of Legal Positivism, 9 CAN. J. LEGAL
JURISPRUDENCE 361, 361 (1996) (critical notice of WIL J. WALUCHOW, INCLUSIVE
LEGAL POSITIVISM (1994)).
See Jules L. Coleman & Brian Leiter, Legal Positivism, in A COMPANION To
PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 241, 246-47 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
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cern to distinguish with maximum clarity authoritative official
law from non-authoritative custom, these early accounts of
positivism tended to present a picture of the sovereign lawmaker as a single or unified executive or legislative entity.5 9
The second proposition, which is often referred to as the "separation" or "separability thesis"-the notion that law and morality bear no necessary connection-was offered as a means of
distinguishing positivism from the natural law tradition, which
claims that, strictly speaking, there is no such thing as an "immoral law," only moral laws or immoral exercises of power.6"
Broadly speaking, arguments for and against legal positivism fall into two categories. The first class includes conceptual,
linguistic, and/or descriptive arguments attempting to establish or refute the claim that positivism provides the most accurate account of what law is (what makes law "law"), or at least
the best account of how we or people like us employ or use the
concept of law.6 The second set of arguments for and against
positivism are normative rather than descriptive. These claim
that positivism is or is not attractive because it provides an
account of law that allows or does not allow citizens, lawyers,
judges and legal scholars to do certain things better than they
could do otherwise. 2
An example of the latter is Holmes's argument in The
Path of the Law that acceptance of the separation thesis will
promote clarity in legal analysis. If we can remember that law
is distinct from morality, he says there, we will stop using
morally-laden and ambiguous terms such as "duty" and "right"
when describing our legally protected interests and our legally

'9 See, e.g., THOmAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 201 (Michael Oakeshott ed., Collier
1962) (1651) (criticizing the view that common law is a distinct form of law that
does not flow from acts of the executive or legislative sovereign power).
Coleman & Leiter, supra note 58, at 246.
61 Thus much-but not all-of the debate between H.LA Hart and Ronald
Dworkin concerns whether positivism accurately captures what legal actors mean
when they invoke the idea of law.
62 If positivism is best understood solely as a set of non-normative, analytic or
descriptive claims about law, then the normative objections to positivism discussed
herein may not have much force. If positivism correctly defines what law is, then
it is not an objection to positivism-although it is an objection to law-that adopting it produces certain bad consequences. For purposes of this Article, I am content to note that numerous theorists, including leading positivists such as H.L.A.
Hart, have thought it appropriate to make normative arguments concerning posi-

tivism. See NEIL MACCOmiCK, H.LA HART 160 (1981).
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enforceable obligations, thus permitting a precise, "scientific"
description of those interests and obligations.' A second normative argument asserts that positivism's separation thesis
enhances citizens' and officials' ability to fashion a just legal
system. By sharply distinguishing law from morality, positivism sharply distinguishes legal obligation from moral obligation, and thus withholds from legal obligations any moral authority. Acceptance of positivism and the separation thesis
thereby can have the salutory effect of preventing citizens and
officials from indulging in unjustified law-worship, providing
them with the critical distance necessary to permit frank evaluation and bold revision of law in light of morality. This moral
argument for the separation thesis is perhaps most closely
associated with the British utilitarian positivist tradition running from Jeremy Bentham through H.LA Hart.'
2. Critique of the Moral Argument: Fuller and Cover
The above-described normative arguments claim that positivism is an attractive theory of law because it promotes the
attainment of certain expedient or moral goods. These arguments for the separation thesis, particularly the moral argument, have been subjected to powerful critiques by Lon Fuller
and Robert Cover.' Although their theories differed in many
respects,' Fuller and Cover both argued that positivism cannot claim as one of its virtues that its acceptance will promote
moral criticism of law. Seizing on the early positivists' opposition to judge-made common law, they argued that such a claim
is contradicted by positivism's inherent commitment to an ex-

Holmes, Path, supra note 5, at 459-60.
See, e.g., Hart, Positivism, supra note 55, at 597.
" The following summary is based on Lon L. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to
Law-A Reply to Professor Hart, 71 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1958) and ROBERT M.
COVER, JUSTICE AccusED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JuDIcIAL PROcEss (1975).
"One important difference is that, whereas Fuller offered his critiques of
positivism in support of an alternative account of law, Cover seems to have believed that, despite all its defects, positivism was the only available account of law
for modem societies skeptical about the existence of natural rights and natural
law. Thus, although as explained below, see infra text acompanying notes 129132, Cover appeared to hold out hope for judicial acts that resist the statist tendencies of law positivistically conceived, his critique of positivism carries with it a
tone of resignation.
"
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tremely passive, deferential description of the judicial function.
Positivism, they thus argued, disables perhaps the most important class of potential law scrutinizers-judges-from engaging
in moral scrutiny as they interpret and apply the law.67
Indeed, as demonstrated by historical instances of judicial
willingness to enforce wicked Nazi and American slavery laws,
positivism, by divorcing law's validity from law's morality,
generates a concept of the judge as the good soldier-one who
does not hesitate to carry out whatever edicts issue forth from
executive or legislative bodies.68 Thus, one finds otherwise
upstanding German and American judges in the thrall of positivism disingenuously claiming that they have no choice but to
enforce the plain terms of oppressive statutes, while simultaneously denying countervailing appeals to justice and equity on
the grounds that such considerations are ultra vires-not matters properly entertained by judges.6 9
Fuller's and Cover's moral critique of positivism can be
broken down into three distinct claims. First, it claims that
positivism generates a particular theory of the judicial function
within a political system. Specifically, positivism posits the
executive or legislature as the sovereign lawmaker. A
positivistically conceived judiciary, by contrast, exercises no
sovereignty of its own-has no authority or responsibility to
make law.7" Instead, the judge's job in adjudicating legal disputes is limited to two functions. (Here it is easiest to think in
terms of cases of statutory interpretation.) She must engage in
a procedural inquiry into the pedigree of the law in question to
determine whether the rule or norm before the court consti-

Fuller, supra note 65, at 637; COVER, supra note 65, at 119-21.

68 Fuller, supra note 65, at 648-57 (discussing behavior of Nazi judges); COVER,

supra note 65, at 159-91 (discussing behavior of American antebellum judges).
"' Fuller, supra note 65, at 637; COVER, supra note 65, at 119-21. Cover tended

to express his critique in psychological terms-he suggested that judges operating
on positivist premises were psychologically unable to question, reinterpret or renounced wicked laws. See, e.g., COVER, supra note 65, at 227-29 (discussing "cognitive dissonance" experienced by judges). Nevertheless, he maintained that this

psychological connection in turn evidenced a conceptual linkage between positivism
and judicial quiescence. See COVER, supra note 65, at 258-59 (judicial abdication

owes in part to the positivist 'juristic competence" of the antebellum era.).
"0Fuller, supra note 65, at 634 (arguing that Benthamite positivist tradition
supports legislative supremacy); COVER, supra note 65, at 29, 131-32.
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tutes a valid act of the society's sovereign institutions. Having
done this, she must then determine the precise content of the
law in question."'
In its second aspect, the Fuller-Cover critique claims that
positivism must also endorse a particular method by which
this latter interpretive function will be performed. Specifically,
positivism presupposes that judges will be able to decide cases
by employing interpretive techniques that promise to be both
non-controversial and highly determinate, such as plain language analysis, originalism, or a mechanistic account of stare
decisis.7 2 Positivism's endorsement of this sort of 'formalist'
decision making flows from its account of the judicial function:
such methods of adjudication are the only ones consistent with
the claim that adjudication does not entail the exercise of the
sovereign's law-making power.7"
Finally, one finds, particularly in Cover's analysis, an
intriguing if somewhat cryptic claim that positivism's account
of the judicial role creates a judicial ethic that stands diametrically opposed to the account of law and morality contained in
the moral argument for the separation thesis. According to
Cover, positivism not only generates a normative argument
that judges should not scrutinize the substantive merits of
laws (and should instead accept an amoral, passive and mechanistic account of adjudication), it generates the strongest possible version of such an argument; namely, that judicial passivity is necessary to ensure the very survival of civilized society. 4 Positivism, on this view, supports the notion that anything less than unflinching judicial fidelity to the institutions
of the sovereign will entail anarchy.
According to Fuller and Cover, these features of positivism-its conception of the judicial function, its theory of interpretation, and its theory of judicial fidelity to the
State-explain the historical, empirical fact that judges who
have embraced positivism have behaved in a manner exactly
contrary to the picture of the open-minded, critical, reformist

Fuller, supra note 65, at 647.
Fuller, supra note 65, at 661-69 (attributing belief in plain meaning approach to Hartes positivism); COVER, supra note 65, at 136, 232-36 (discussing
originalism and formalism).
Fuller, supra note 65, at 637; COVER, supra note 65, at 232-36.
1' COVER, supra note 65, at 229-32.
71

BROOELYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63: 225

official invoked by positivists in support of the separation thesis. By offering a theory of law with a procedural conception of
legal validity, a theory of adjudication and interpretation that
stresses the constrained and nondiscretionary nature of adjudication, and by sanctioning the strongest possible justification
for such restraint, positivism causes judges to ignore the substance of the laws they apply, and to enforce indiscriminately
all rules and norms actually generated by their sovereign, no
matter how arbitrary, irrational or cruel.75
B. Dyzenhaus on Legal Positivism and HobbesianPolitical
Theory
In Hard Cases in Wicked Legal Systems, Professor
Dyzenhaus sought, through a study of South African decisions,
to take up the anti-positivist mantle of Fuller and Cover. Just
as they had argued that positivism's moral defects were evidenced by judicial validation of wicked American and German
laws, he argued that the positivism of South African judges
was responsible for their willingness to enforce immoral
apartheid statutes.7 6 In making this claim, however,
Dyzenhaus took more seriously than his predecessors the arguments of modern positivists, and thus his analysis marked a
significant advance in the debate over the moral argument for
the separation thesis.
1. Taking Hart
Discretion

Seriously:

Positivism

and Judicial

To understand Dyzenhaus's development of the moral
critique of positivism requires an additional piece of exposition.
In this instance, the subject is H.L.A. Hart, arguably the leading legal positivist of this century.
The critique of positivism found in the work of Professors
Fuller and Cover are stated in very broad terms. Positivism,
they seem to say, simply cannot tolerate the notion of an inde"' In Fuller's effective imagery- "The German lawyer was .. . peculiarly prepared to accept as 'law' anything that called itself by that name, was printed at
government expense, and seemed to come 'von oben herab.' " Fuller, supra note 65,
at 659.
7' DYZENHAUS, WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 56, at vii-ix.

19971

STYLE AND SKEPTICISM

pendent judiciary that engages in a non-mechanical form of
legal reasoning.7 7 Stated as such, their critique seemed ungenerous, if not unfair, to sophisticated versions of positivism
such as Harts. Indeed, one of the central features of Harts
work is its attempt to divorce the defense of positivism as a
theory of law from the rejection by earlier positivists, such as
Jeremy Bentham, of the notion of judicial discretion and judgemade law. In fact, according to Hart, it is a virtue of positivism
that-in contrast to theories of natural law and common
law-it clearly identifies instances of discretionary judicial lawmaking.
Hart famously defined law as a system of authoritative
primary (regulatory) and secondary (power-conferring) rules."
Any legal system containing a secondary rule that judges must
decide all disputes properly before them is guaranteed to be a
legal system in which some discretionary adjudication occurs.
This conclusion follows from what Hart called the "open texture" of rules.79 In order to cover classes or categories of conduct, rules, whether statutory or judge-made, must necessarily
be expressed in general and abstract language. Judges applying rules will inevitably confront hard cases-disputes in
which the language of the rule does not yield a definitive answer. In such cases, the judicial obligation to decide will require judges to exercise discretion unconstrained by the language of statute or case-holding." This does not mean that
judges will simply flip a coin, nor does it mean that they ought
to always decide such cases by reference to moral considerations, as opposed to considerations of expedience."' It does
mean, however, that judges will inevitably face cases in which
they have to "legislate and so exercise a creative choice be-

' See supra text accompanying notes 70-73.
78 H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 77-79 (1961).
Id. at 124-25.
See Hart, Positivism, supra note 55, at 614, 629.
s' See HL.A. Hart, Problems of the Philosophy of Law, 6 THE ErCYCLOPEDIA
OF PHILOSOPHY 264, 271 (Paul Edwards ed., 1967), reprinted in H.L.A. HART, ESSAYS, supra note 42, at 88, 107 (judges required by judicial conventions to appeal
7'

in hard cases to "a wide variety of individual and social interests, social and political aims, and standards of morality and justice").
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tween alternatives."82 It also means that, in certain instances,
their choice should and will be guided by moral considerations.'
According to Hart, then, the attempt to attribute a particularly passive, mechanical account of adjudication to legal
positivism's theory of law rests on a fallacy; there is no inconsistency whatsoever between the positivist claim that law is a
body of rules enacted by recognized sovereign institutions, and
the claim that judges can and do sometimes exercise sovereignty (make law), or the claim that they should sometimes exercise their independent moral judgment. To the contrary, he
argued that it is a virtue of legal positivism that its account of
law and rules clearly distinguishes instances of discretionary
and non-discretionary adjudication. By contrast, non-positivist
theories of law, particularly theories of common law, tend to
conflate discretionary and non-discretionary decisions by describing the former metaphorically, as instances in which
"judges are only 'drawing out' of the rule what, if it is properly
understood, is 'latent' within it."" Positivism treats such talk
as obfuscation. Decisions in hard cases are not interpretive-they are simply judicial law-making, i.e., judicial acts of
sovereignty. Contrary to the arguments of Fuller and Cover,
Hart's positivism directs both judges and observers of the legal
system to acknowledge that judges cannot and should not
always mechanically follow legislative or executive directives.
2. Relocating The Problems of Positivism
Hart's account of positivism offers a partial response to the
anti-positivist arguments of Fuller and Cover. In particular, it
responds to their broadest claims that positivism entails the
adoption of an account of the judicial function under which
judges are never authorized to exercise discretion or engage in
moral deliberation in the course of deciding disputes before
them, and thus must act merely as the unreflective conduits of
Hart, Positivism, supra note 55, at 612.
Hart, Positivism, supra note 55, at 613 (in exercising discretion to sentence
criminal, judge is expected to rely on his moral judgment).
Hart, Positivism, supra note 55, at 612; see also Hart, Positivism, supra note
55, at 614 (refusing "invitation" to treat discretionary decisions as decisions guided
by principles or ends implicit in law).
82
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political decisions made by other institutions.' Yet, in Wicked
Legal Systems, Professor Dyzenhaus aimed to bolster the Fuller and Cover position even while conceding to Hart that positivism does permit discretionary judicial decision-malting, and
thus does not logically entail a commitment to an intolerably
passive account of the judicial function, or to formalism in
statutory and common law interpretation. Indeed, Dyzenhaus
accepted that Hart's account of judicial discretion successfully
demonstrates that legal positivism does not logically entail a
theory of adjudication under which judges have no authority or
occasion to make substantive moral judgments in their application of law.'
Notwithstanding this concession, Dyzenhaus claimed to
find in the performance of the South African judges he studied
evidence of a connection between positivism and judicial acquiescence to immoral laws somewhat different than the one described by Fuller and Cover. For, as Fuller and Cover might
have predicted, those South African judges who displayed a
positivist understanding of law did in fact embrace originalism
in statutory interpretation (albeit not a mechanical or formalistic originalism), and did in fact always deny that they possessed or should exercise the discretion that Hartes positivism
allowed them. Thus, even though Hart had shown that Fuller
and Cover were wrong to argue that positivism itself entails
across-the-board judicial passivity, the strong correlation between the two in the opinions of the South African judges
seemed to confirm the existence of some other analytic link between them.87
Harts account does not, by contrast, dissolve the problem (much discussed
by Cover) that positivism poses to the judge confronted with the task of applying
a valid, clear, and clearly wicked law. In such a case, there would appear to be
no room for judicial discretion, and Harts positivism would apparently leave the
judge with the options of applying the law faithfully, applying the law
disingenuously (i.e., to lying), or resigning. Whether this result renders positivism
a particularly defective theory of law is a much-disputed question.
86 See, eg., DYZENHAUS, WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 56, at 58 (acknowledging that Hart rejects formalism and originalism as inconsistent with
positivist account of adjudication in hard cases); DYZENAUS, WICKED LEGAL SysTMS, supra note 56, at 242-47 (accepting for purposes of argument the Hartian
notion of judicial discretionary law making).
8 DYZENHAUS, WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 56, at 213, 217-20 (decribing commitment of positivist South African judges to nondiacretionary, "plain fact"
approach to adjudication).
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Fuller's and Cover's mistake, according to Dyzenhaus, was
to look for this correlation within the narrow confines of legal
theory. In fact, the connection between positivism and acquiescent adjudication cannot be found within legal positivism per
se. Instead, it is generated by the broader background political
theory that supports legal positivism, and of which legal positivism forms one part; namely, the political theory of Thomas
Hobbes. 8
Hobbes built his theory on the premise that individuals
left to their own devices will always disagree about who is
entitled to what. Ongoing, violent conflict could thus only be
avoided if each person ceded his natural right to exercise his
own judgment as to what is right or fair to the sovereign, a
unitary and absolute authority (a monarch or a legislative
body)., 9 In return, the sovereign would impose on all citizens
a set of rules determining their rights and duties, thereby
eliminating controversy and unrest, and providing citizens
with the security that would permit them to go about their
lives within the confines of these rules.'
A positivist account of law flows quite naturally from this
account of the state. For a Hobbesian, law is not a natural
order; it is rather the set of artificial rules posited by the sovereign and imposed by it on the citizenry. The proper judicial
role would also seem to follow from these Hobbesian premises.
It consists only of discovering and enforcing the commands
which the sovereign has in fact issued. The relationship between sovereign and judge on this model appears unidirectional: the judge is a subordinate official created by the absolute
sovereign and charged with the job of faithfully executing the
sovereign's commands."'

DYZENHAUS, WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 56, at 221-22.
89 See HOBBES, supra note 59, at 200 ("For in the differences of private men,

to declare, what is equity, what is justice, and what is moral virtue, and to make
them binding, there is need of the ordinances of sovereign power . . . ").

HOBBES, supra note 59, at 200 ("[Elvery subject in a commonwealth, hath
covenanted to obey the civil law, either one with another, as when they assemble
to make a common representative, or with the representative itself one by one,
when subdued by the sword they promise obedience, that they may receive
life .. . .").
91 HOBBES, supra note 59, at 205 (judge owes loyalty only to sovereign, whose

"intendments" he is to enforce).
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The central argument of Wicked Legal Systems is that the
statist tendencies of positivism are located not in positivism
itself, but in the Hobbesian political theory that positivism
presupposes. A judge who accepts positivism as part of her
acceptance of Hobbes's political theory will always operate on
the premise that her own will and her own moral judgment
have no legitimate role to play in the making of law.' This is
because on Hobbes's account, judging cannot consist of the
exercise of Hartian discretion: such a manner of adjudication
explicitly requires judges to make law in violation of the
sovereign's exclusive right to make judgments about what is
prudent, reasonable, right, and fair.' Thus, even if Hart was
correct that a judge often will have no choice but to exercise
discretion (because, given the nature of rules, the sovereign
cannot possibly express itself clearly as to all matters which
will come before the judge), according to Dyzenhaus, the
positivist judge will never be willing to concede that she possesses that discretion, much less that she ought to exercise
that discretion by engaging in a frank determination of what
the law (morally or expediently) ought to be. Instead she will,
perhaps vainly or disingenuously, insist on deferring to any
available evidence of the will or intent of the sovereign. For to
acknowledge the existence of judicial discretion would violate
the premises of the "political ideal" which led the judge to
embrace positivism in the first place.' Thus, according to
Dyzenhaus, Hart's attempt to rescue positivism from Fuller's
and Cover's critique was destined to fail because "[his] claim

92

DYZENHAUs, WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 56, at 224.

HOBBES, supra note 59, at 199 ('he judgment of what is reasonable, and of
what is to be abolished, belongeth to him that maketh the law, which is the sovereign ....
"). Hobbes also makes this point in his attack on common law method: "where men build on false grounds, the more they build, the greater is the ruin.... [Therefore it is not that juris prudentia, or wisdom of subordinate judges,
but the reason of this our artificial man the commonwealth, and his command,
'

that maketh law. .

.

. " HOBBES, supra note 59, at 202. Hobbes also states:

In all courts of justice, the sovereign, which is the person of the commonwealth, is he that judgeth: the subordinate judge ought to have regard to the reason, which moved his sovereign to make such law, that
his sentence may be according thereunto; which then is his sovereign's
sentence; otherwise it is his own, and an unjust one.
HOBBES, supra note 59 at 202.
94 DYZENHAUS, WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 56, at 224 (describing
positivist judges' adherence to a Hobbesian political ideal).
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about Ijudicial] discretion is... in pragmatic contradiction to
the authoritarian ideal which perforce drives [his] conception
of law."
3. Problems with the Hobbesian Turn
By responding to the strongest arguments put forth by the
positivists it ultimately critiques, Wicked Legal Systems
marked an important advance in the prolonged normative
debate over positivism and the separation thesis. In so doing,
it also managed to avoid many of the confusions that have
plagued this debate, particularly the tendency among antipositivists to lump together criticisms of positivism with criticisms of mechanical or deductive jurisprudence. 9 As
Dyzenhaus explains, although the positivist judges he studied
all subscribed to a method of statutory interpretation which
denied that judges retain discretion to decide the case before
them by appeal to principles of prudence or morality, none of
them maintained that the determination of legislative or executive intent was a simple or deductive enterprise.'
Wicked Legal Systems also offered an explanation that ties
together more tightly the assemblage of antipositivist criticisms found in Fuller's and Cover's critiques. In particular,
Dyzenhaus's linkage of positivism to Hobbesian political theory
explains Cover's intriguing but somewhat mysterious claim
that positivism causes judges to attribute the strongest possible moral justification to maintaining a passive role within the
political system." Indeed, this explanation lies at the heart of
Dyzenhaus's account of the "pragmatic contradiction." Even if
any given exercise of independent judicial judgment does not in
fact threaten to provoke civil unrest, each such act does, given
the premises of Hobbesian political theory, undermine the
sovereign's claim to absolute authority, and thus undermines
the terms on which the social order is constructed. The key to
preventing the Hobbesian war of all against all is the relinDYZENHAUS, WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 56, at 243.
6

See Anthony J. Sebok, MisunderstandingPositivism, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2054,

2090-93 (1995) (describing tendency of some American theorists to conflate formalism and positivism).
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DYZENHAUS, WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS, s,vra note 56, at 91-92.

" See supra text accompanying note 74.

1997]

STYLE AND SKEPTICISM

quishment by each citizen to the sovereign of the right to exercise judgment. Unwavering judicial acquiescence to the commands of the absolute sovereign is therefore necessary to the
continued legitimacy of the sovereign, and thus to the maintenance of order and the avoidance of anarchy.
To praise Wicked Legal Systems for its clarity and rigor, is
not, however, to assert that its argument is without difficulties. Two problems, in particular, afflict that argument. First,
it is ambiguous as to the strength of the relationship between
Hobbesian political theory and the Hartian account of discretionary adjudication. At times, it appears to assert that legal
positivism logically presupposes Hobbesian political theory-that the latter is the only justification of the state which
can justify adoption of the former. It would follow from this
that Hartian legal positivism, by proceeding from Hobbesian
premises yet calling for the exercise of judicial discretion, is
conceptually incoherent, and that judges who embrace positivism are logically committed to a rejection of discretion. Yet one
also finds in the book a weaker version of this argument which
concedes that one can be a non-Hobbesian legal positivist, and
thus that some positivists can coherently endorse a Hartian
(non-acquiescent) theory of adjudication.' On this version,
Dyzenhaus's critique of positivism is more a piece of descriptive rather than conceptual jurisprudence, asserting as an
empirical matter that positivist judges (or at least South African positivist judges) were in fact Hobbesians, and it is only
because of this contingent fact that they were not willing to
engage in Hartian discretionary adjudication.
Perhaps because of this ambiguity, Wicked Legal Systems
also does not provide a satisfactorily nuanced account of the
relationship between Hobbes's political theory and his account
of law and adjudication. Indeed, it seems to me a case can be
made from chapter 26 of Hobbes's Leviathan ("Of Civil Laws")
that even Hobbes's early positivist theories of law and adjudication are substantially more complex than Dyzenhaus's argu

9Compare DYZENHAUS, WICKED LEGAL SYSTEmS, supra note 56, at 23942
(positivist conception of law 'only" makes sense given Hobbesian premises), with
DYZENaHAUS, WICKED LEGAL SYSTMS, supra note 56, at 247 (criticizing modern
positivists for "as yet" failing to provide a political theory adequate to reconcile
positivist theory of law with a meaningful notion of judicial discretion).
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ment suggests, and like Hart's, actually sanction an important
role for robust, discretionary, even moral adjudication."'0
Hobbes does define law positivistically as the command of
the sovereign. He thus rejects the notion of natural law, understood as a set of universal and authoritative principles of right
and justice. But his rejection of natural law is of a particular
and limited nature. Hobbes does not deny the existence of universally valid principles of justice. Rather he denies that they
possess the binding authority that characterizes law. "Natural
law," in other words, refers to something that is natural, but
not to something that is law: it identifies universally acknowledged, yet frequently flouted, principles of fairness and justice.' 0 ' The problem represented by the state of nature is not
the absence of principles by which to determine who is entitled
to what, but rather that people, because of widespread ignorance, the inherent manipulability of language, and natural
self-preference, routinely misunderstand or ignore those principles.0 2 Hobbes's rejection of natural law thus does not flow
from skepticism about the possibility of knowing what justice
and morality entail. Access to their basic principles is in fact at
hand: "The laws of nature.., need not any publishing, nor
proclamation; as being contained in this one sentence, approved by all the world. Do not that to another, which thou
thinkest unreasonable to be done by another to thyself."0 3
Rather, Hobbes is skeptical about people and their willingness
to obtain and act on this knowledge.'

10 Dyzenhaus actually acknowledges this complexity in Wicked Legal Systems.
See DYZENHAUS, WICKED LEGAL SYSTEMS, supra note 56, at 236 n.57.
101HOBBES, supra note 59, at 199-200 ("For the laws of nature, which consist in
equity, justice, gratitude and other moral virtues on these depending, in the condition of mere nature . . . are not properly laws, but qualities that dispose men to
peace and obedience.").
102 HOBBES, supra note 59, at 200, 214.

10 HOBBES, supra note 59, at 203.
104 None of this should be especially

surprising to readers of Hobbes. The entire
Hobbesian argument is, after all, constructed on the moral premise that each
individual citizen is born free and equal-the "natural liberty of men"--from which
it follows that no private citizen has the right to force his own judgments on
another, and that the sovereign must be established by individuals ceding their
natural right to judge for themselves what is right and wrong. See HOBBES, supra
note 59, at 200 ("natural liberty of men"); HOBBES, supra note 59, at 213 ("It is
equity which is the law of nature, and therefore the eternal law of God, that
every man equally enjoy his own liberty.").
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That Hobbes's rejection of natural law does not derive
from a strong form of moral skepticism significantly complicates his account of positive law and adjudication. In particular, it permits the possibility that the sovereign might choose
to incorporate the content of natural law into its commands,
thereby rendering natural law's hortatory principles authoritative.05 Hobbes's "incorporationist" positive theory of law, in
turn, permits a rather subtle account of adjudication.' Once
the sovereign commands that the citizenry abide by the general principles of natural law or equity, these general equitable
principles become binding law by virtue of their incorporation
into a sovereign command. Their incorporation does not, however, render them any more easily applied to particular disputes. Judges faced with disputes within this equity jurisdiction are thus left to determine of their own accord what the
law is, which in these instances, is also what the law ought to
be. Indeed, for this class of cases, says Hobbes-railing against
the tendency of common lawyers to rely too heavily on precedent-nothing can "discharge the present judge of the trouble
of studying what is equity, in the case he is to judge, from the
principles of his own natural reason.""7
The sovereign's incorporation of natural principles of justice into positive law likewise affects the proper method of
statutory interpretation. The goal of statutory interpretation is
to divine the intent or spirit of a law from its literal terms.
Nevertheless, according to Hobbes, no less than Hart, the
fickle nature of language entails that there will always be
instances in which the sovereign fails to articulate its intent,
yet nevertheless expects citizens and officials to act in accordance with it. When faced with such open-textured commands,
the judge is instructed by Hobbes to ask what the sovereign
would have decided had he thought about the case at hand.
But this turns out not to be a simple factual inquiry into sov-

11

According to Hobbes, this possibility is neither remote nor speculative: sover-

eigns have, as it turns out, tended to command their citizens to comply with natural justice. ("The law of nature therefore is a part of the civil law in all commonwealths of the world."). HOBBES, supra note 59, at 200.
106 There is, of course, today a lively literature in analytic legal philosophy on
"incorporationistV positivism. See, e.g., Perry, supra note 57, at 362.
10 HOBBES, supra note 59, at 201; see also HOBBES, supra note 59, at 204-05
(in cases governed by "common equity" judge must "verifyW what equity requires).
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ereign intent, for the judge is instead directed to consider what
equity requires." 8 The latter is the relevant inquiry because,
in the absence of direct evidence to the contrary, the sovereign
will be presumed to have issued commands consonant with
equity and reason.' In other words, since the judge's ultimate commission is to divine the intent behind the sovereign's
commands, and since the intention of the sovereign is presumed to be an intent to do equity---"for it were a great contumely for a judge to think otherwise of the sovereign"-the
judge "ought... if the word of the law do not fully authorize a
reasonable sentence, to supply it with the law of nature, or if
the case be difficult, to respite judgment till he have received
more ample authority.""0 Only if the law clearly commands
an inequitable outcome must the judge apply it so as to effect
that result."'
As it turns out, then, Hobbes himself appears to have
rejected Dyzenhaus's claim that Hobbesian political theory
entails a consistently acquiescent account of the judicial function. Rather, in his own hands, Hobbes's modest moral skepticism generated a subtle account of the interrelation of law,
adjudication, and morality---one that, like Hart's, seems immune to the charge that it generates the account of judging to
which Fuller, Cover and Dyzenhaus object. Indeed, Hobbes's
positivism would seem to demand that judges frequently exer-

108

HOBBES, supra note 59, at 203. ("For example, if the sovereign employ a

public minister, without written instructions what to do; he is obliged to take for
instructions the dictates of reason; as if he make a judge, the judge is to take
notice, that his sentence ought to be according to the reason of his sovereign,

which being always understood to be equity, he is bound to do by the law of nature . . ").
109 HOBBES, supra note 59, at 209 ("[The will of another cannot be understood
but by his own word, or act, or by conjecture taken from his scope and purpose;
which in the person of the commonwealth, is to be supposed always consonant
with equity and reason.").
110HOBBES, supra note 59, at 209. To give Hobbes's example, if a statute states
that a man forcibly thrust out of his home by another is entitled to be forcibly
restored to his home, a man who is nonforcibly (but wrongfully) ousted from his
home should be accorded relief under the statute notwithstanding its literal inapplicability because such an inequitable result could not have been the intention of
the law maker. HOBBES, supra note 59, at 209.
1 HOBBES, supra note 59, at 201.
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cise independent moral judgment, because the sovereign has,
by incorporating natural law into positive law, commanded
them to do so.
C. Legal Positivism and Strong Moral Skepticism
1. Hobbes Revisited
Wicked Legal Systems thus never satisfactorily articulated
what it is about the relationship between Hobbesian political
theory and positivism that generates across-the-board judicial
acquiescence to evil legal regimes. In my view, Professor
Dyzenhaus now shares this dissatisfaction. Indeed, his present
paper, I would suggest, constitutes a conscientious effort to refine and elaborate the relationship between Hobbesian political
theory, legal positivism and judicial complacency in the face of
evil laws.
That Dyzenhaus's paper is a continuation of his previous
efforts is apparent from its structure and focus. Its heart consists of brief accounts of the positivist legal theories of Hobbes,
Bentham, Austin, Holmes and Carl Schmitt. Notably, each account attempts to elaborate on the relationship between the
theorist's commitment to legal positivism and the broader
normative political theory of which that positivism forms a
part.
One feature of this sequence is, however, novel and striking. Dyzenhaus is very much concerned to distinguish among
positivists. Hobbes, Bentham and Holmes may all be legal
positivists, but they differ because their positivisms derive
from very different normative visions. In drawing such distinctions, Dyzenhaus clearly signals his abandonment of the strong
version of the "pragmatic contradiction," which asserts that
legal positivism necessarily presupposes Hobbesian political
theory." The issue is no longer why legal positivism generates a corrupt and acquiescent account of adjudication, but
why certain forms of positivism do so. On this score, at least,
Dyzenhaus now concedes that there is a distinction to be
relatively benign and invidious forms of posidrawn between
3
tivism.1
1

See supra text accompanying notes 95, 99.
Dyzenhaus is probably still sufficiently unattracted to positivism to concede
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What, then, determines whether a given positivist theory
of law will be capable of generating an acceptable account of
law and adjudication? As in Wicked Legal Systems, the claim
here is that everything depends on the content of the background political theory. In the book, as we have seen, the villain was Hobbes. In this paper, however, Hobbes is given
something of a reprieve. Dyzenhaus instead reserves his harshest words for two new villains: Carl Schmitt and Holmes.
Dyzenhaus begins his paper by reiterating the claim of
Wicked Legal Systems that Hobbesian positivism appears to
generate a problematic account of law and adjudication because of its skeptical premises." 4 It turns out, however, that
this picture is not a fair portrayal of Hobbes. For Hobbes "never quite succeeded in constructing an entirely absolutist solution to the problem of the state of nature.""' Instead, "[tihe
rights of each individual in that state persist in various ways
into the state of civil society, so that Hobbes never advanced
an absolutely unconditional obligation of obedience to the sovereign.""' Hobbes designed his authoritarian system with the
"overarching aim of providing the individual with security and
protection," an aim which presupposes the acceptance of a
normative proposition about the natural equality and freedom
of individuals." 7 This in turn indicates that Hobbes was not
the full blown skeptic Dyzenhaus once made him out to be,
and, by implication, suggests that the theories of law and adjudication that flow from his premises need not be so consistently authoritarian as Dyzenhaus once believed."'

that it exists in any genuinely salutory forms.
.. Dyzenhaus states:

[The war of all against all comes about] because Hobbes thought that
each individual has the right to determine what is right; however, each

individual will have different views about what is right. The state of nature is hence a chaos of competing claims as to what is right. To solve
this problem, and achieve order and stability, we must delegate our right
to determine what is right to an absolute sovereign, whose commands we
are morally obliged to obey.
Dyzenhaus, supra note 6, at 171.
115

Dyzenhaus, supra note 6, at 179.

...Dyzenhaus, supra note 6,
.. Dyzenhaus, supra note 6,
.. Dyzenhaus's reassessment
Schmitt. See David Dyzenhaus,

at 179.
at 22-23.
of Hobbes is already evident in his 1994 article on
'Now the Machine Runs Itself". Carl Schmitt on

Hobbes and Kelsen, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 6-7 (1994).
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2. The Positivism, Skepticism, and Statism of Schmitt
Hobbes having been partially vindicated, Dyzenhaus's
search for the source of the intolerably passive account of the
judicial function must continue. Returning to his Fullerian
roots, he redirects his focus toward the modern paradigm of
evil law-Nazi Germany-and finds a new nemesis in Carl
Schmitt, whose work in some ways provides the focus of his
conference paper.
According to Dyzenhaus, Schmitt, like Hobbes, believed
the fundamental problem of political theory to be the establishment of order in the face of human-created chaos. However,
his diagnosis of the source of this disorder was significantly
different from Hobbes's. For Schmitt, the problem goes beyond
the fact that people tend to be ignorant, confused and selfcentered and thus tend to ignore or misunderstand basic principles of justice. The problem in modern society is that there
are no principles of justice, or at least that there is no way of
demonstrating that any given account of what is just is superior to any other." 9 Modernity is a condition marked by the
abandonment of both traditional modes of moral justification
(appeals to custom, tradition, religion) and of the enlightenment hope of a scientific or rationalist justification of normative principles. Thus, it is a locus of irreducible moral conflict-a collection of individuals and groups serving warring
gods.
From these premises, Schmitt mounted a radical critique
of Weimar liberal-democracy." Liberal democratic institutions, he maintained, could only result in a perpetual,
destabilizing and finally meaningless succession of political
fights among individuals and interest groups with different
visions of what is good and just." Although this problem of
irreducible, empty political conflict was uniquely modern,
Schmitt believed that Hobbes had long ago hit upon the solution: the construction of an artificial and absolute order.
'" Dyzenhaus, supra note 6, at 181-182; see also Dyzenhaus, supra note 118, at
5-6, 13.
My description here of Schmitt's project is extrapolated entirely from the
account offered by Dyzenhaus in this and earlier worlm.
"'
Dyzenhaus, supra note 118, at 16.
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Schmitt, however, had learned from Hobbes's mistake of attempting to build the case for absolutism on moral, individualist premises, since (as Hobbes's incomplete authoritarianism
demonstrates), those premises could always be used to form
claims of right against which the acts of the absolute sovereign
could be interpreted or judged. Avoiding this mistake required
the establishment of an absolute sovereign by fiat rather than
reason. Thus, Schmitt apparently envisioned the revolutionary
overthrow of Weimar by a charismatic leader, one who would
found
a new Germany and claim absolute authority for him122
self.

Aware of the inherent instability of liberal societies, this
sovereign would embrace and promulgate an illiberal German
ideology which would describe the country as an ethnically
homogenous and ideologically orthodox Volk, an organic nation
free of internal political dispute. 1 3 By providing this state
religion, the sovereign could ensure order and stability, thereby artificially creating the conditions under which citizens
could ascribe a telos to their lives, namely the perpetuation of
the people and their nation. Although it is not clear from
Dyzenhaus's description, law's primary function within this
political system apparently would be to maintain this order.'
Subordinate officials, including judges, would then
function as the enforcers of measures taken by the sovereign to
maintain and perpetuate this order.
In Schmitt, Dyzenhaus appears to have found a theorist
who has managed to construct a political theory which, unlike
Hobbes's, actually succeeds in "elevat[ing] ... stability and cer-

tainty into the exclusive values of legal order... ,125 and
who fully justifies an account of the judicial function from
which any notion of discretion or critical scrutiny is removed.
But what exactly is it about Schmittian political theory that
permits it to succeed in constructing a genuinely statist theory
of law's function and a genuinely passive account of adjudica-

, Dyzenhaus, supra note 6, at 183.
Dyzenhaus, supra note 6, at 183-84.
124 Presumably, the criminal law, and in particular, sedition laws, would be
centrally important to Schmitt's project.
" Dyzenhaus, supra note 6, at 187.
"'
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tion? What is it that separates Schmitt's truly invidious positivism from the less invidious or benign positivism of the other
members of this tradition?
Part of Dyzenhaus's answer must be this: the British
positivist tradition, exemplified by Hobbes, Bentham, Austin
and later Hart, lies on the far side of a conceptual divide that
Schmitt has crossed. Each of these other theorists is, in an
important sense, "premodern." They are premodern because
none endorses the radical moral nihilism that defines "modernity." Bentham and Austin (and later Hart, who appears to be
a throwback) were in fact antiskeptics: they anchored their
arguments for legal positivism on what they took to be the
objectively defensible normative principle of utility maxiinization.' Other classical positivists, such as Hobbes, were skeptical only of the empirical likelihood of moral agreement, not of
the existence or content of true moral principles. The classical
British positivists thus possess an attribute that disqualifies
them from playing Dyzenhaus's bad man: they stand on the far
(nonskeptical) side of the inchoate historical and conceptual
divide between premodernity and modernity. It is only when
that boundary is crossed that one can find the extreme moral
skepticism that fuels the lethal form of legal positivism found
in Schmitt.
This answer, of course, prompts the next question: What
makes strong moral skepticism and legal positivism such a
deadly cocktail? Perhaps the best way to appreciate this point
is to recall the moral argument for the separation thesis as
originally propounded by the British positivists. That argument maintains that the strength of positivism lies in the fact
that it permits citizens and officials to engage in a forthright
moral critique of the law.' Obviously, the central premise of
this claim is that there is a publicly available set of values by
which to critique law. Absent such values, the moral argument
for the separation thesis makes no sense. A political theory
founded on strong skepticism which incorporates legal positivism cannot possibly defend positivism on the ground that it
permits reform of the law towards some objective or shared
conception of justice or morality.'
Dyzenhaus, supra note 6, at 169-77.
=" See supra text accompanying note 64.
"'
Hence Harts insistence that positivism not be confused with strong moral
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As a negative proposition, then, we can see why strong
skepticism undermines the moral argument for the separation
thesis. Nevertheless, it still does not follow that positivism
driven by a strongly skeptical moral theory must generate a
statist theory of law or a complacent account of adjudication.
Even if it is true that judges cannot claim to be interpreting
and reforming law so as to render it in conformity with a
shared notion of fairness or goodness, this does not entail that
they should never interpret or reform law in light of some notion of fairness and goodness.
Ironically, one may find a radically skeptical modernist
with aspirations for an active judiciary in none other than Professor Cover. His theories of law and adjudication, like
Schmitt's, appear to accept the premise that value judgments
are personal or limited in validity to one's cultural, or religious
social sub-group.'29 Nevertheless, Cover maintained that one
of the social functions which law ought to serve is that of
structuring and articulating, through rules and decisions moral
or normative frameworks ("nomian worlds"), which enable individual citizens and groups to articulate their own conceptions
of value. 3 ' Given this function, Cover hoped that judges
would interpret doctrine and statutes in light of their own conceptions of justice and human flourishing.3 ' One thus can
find in Cover's work strong moral skepticism generating a plea
for judges to act as modern "prophets"--as persons who,
through the interpretation and application of law, create and
expose values, despite the fact that these values have no universal warrant. 2
If this is a plausible interpretation of Cover (or even a
coherent account of law and adjudication), then Schmitt's relativism alone cannot explain his endorsement of statism and
judicial acquiescence. Rather, the explanation in his case lies
in some intermediate premise, namely the notion that it would
skepticism. See Hart, Positivism, supra note 55, at 597.
129 See Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term, Foreword: Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 15, 28-30 (1983) (describing generation and "mitosis" of normative orderings and the distinct nomos inhabited by the Amish).
130 Id. at 68.
131 Id.
132

COVER, supra note 65, at 259 (lamenting the tendency of antebellum judges

to act as "priests" rather than "prophets").
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be a good thing if Germany attained through dictatorial government the maximum degree of ideological orthodoxy and a
strong resistance to economic, political and cultural change.
These substantive values, it would appear, explain Schmitt's
apparent endorsement of a barren conception of law as exclusively devoted to the maintenance of order, and justify his commitment to a passive or deferential account of adjudication."
But if it is not Schmitt's moral skepticism that is doing the
conceptual work here-if it is instead his political commitment
to order and stability as paramount values-then Dyzenhaus
appears to have painted himself into a conceptual corner. This
can be seen most clearly if we take a moment to review the
bidding. We began with the British positivists' claim that one
virtue of positivism is that it permits a clear-eyed moral assessment of the law." Fuller and Cover rejected this claim
by arguing that positivism inhibits such an assessment by
endorsing a theory of the judicial function under which judges
must blindly accept and apply even the most wicked laws."
Hart provided a partial response to these critics by defending a
version of positivism that sanctions a significant place for discretion and moral reasoning in judicial decision-making." s In
light of Hart's response, Dyzenhaus attempted to redirect the
Fuller and Cover critique away from the tenets of positivism
and toward the Hobbesian political ideal of the absolute sovereign. 37 Now, however, Dyzenhaus concedes that it is neither
positivism nor Hobbesian political theory per se, that is responsible for generating the acquiescent model of adjudication
decried in Wicked Legal Systems. Rather, it is the peculiarly
modern combination of positivism and strong moral skepticism.
But, as just demonstrated, even this combination only has the
potential for generating disastrous theories of law and adjudication; a remaining active ingredient still needs to be added,
namely that of Schmitt's order-fetishism.

' Because Schmitt abandons Hobbes's social contractarian account of absolute
authority, he cannot (as perhaps could Hobbes) justify judicial deference on the
grounds that the terms of the social contract bar an individual other than the
sovereign from exercising his own moral judgment.
See supra text accompanying note 64.
See supra text accompanying notes 65-75.
See supra text accompanying notes 78-84.
m See supra text accompanying notes 85-95.
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Even conceding that Dyzenhaus has at last located the
conceptual source of unacceptably acquiescent theories of law
and adjudication, notice what has happened here. First, we are
no longer presented with a critique of legal positivism. It is
true that positivism derived from strong moral skepticism can
generate an unacceptable account of law and adjudication, but
that defect, as we have seen, flows from the skepticism rather
than the positivism. Indeed, given that the main alternative to
positivist theories of law are natural law theories which presuppose some objective account of morality, it may not be possible for a strong skeptic to be anything other than a
positivist.'3 8 Moreover, it is not even strongly skeptical positivism that we are worried about, but rather strongly skeptical
positivism which incorporates Schmitt's extreme political commitments. What started out as a critique of positivism appears
to conclude as a critique of an unusually extreme and unpalatable political vision. In fact, Schmitt's political theoretical
commitments appear to be so strongly antiliberal that there is
a sense in which law and adjudication cease to be the problem.
We have more than enough reason to reject Schmitt before
ever getting to those phenomena. Thus, what was in the work
of Fuller and Cover an attack on legal positivism as a theory of
law now appears to have been refined away to an attack on the
facially atrocious political philosophy of Carl Schmitt.
D. Enter Holmes
If the payoff of Dyzenhaus's project is to be something
more than a critique of radically authoritarian accounts of law
and adjudication that derive from strongly authoritarian political visions, Schmitt has to serve as an illustration of a larger
conceptual problem. Now, at last, we can appreciate why
Holmes in fact plays a much more important role in
Dyzenhaus's conference paper than appearances might first
suggest. It is by identifying Holmes with Schmitt that
Dyzenhaus attempts to establish more general links between
strong moral skepticism and unacceptably statist theories of
law and adjudication; links that do not depend on Schmitt's
overt commitment to a fascist state.
' I thank Scott Shapiro for making this point at the conference.
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1. Horwitz's Two Holmes
To enhance his case for the claim that Holmes belongs
next to Schmitt on the modernist and cynical end of his historical and conceptual spectrum of positivists, Dyzenhaus draws a
sharp distinction between the early and the late Holmes. The
early Holmes, the Holmes of The Common Law, is described as
a relatively benign, premodern admirer of common law adjudication.'39 The later Holmes, the Holmes of The Path of the
Law, has made the transition to positivism, modernism, and
strong skepticism. 40 It is this Holmes-the cynical proponent
of judicial deference to legislative and executive acts of power-which Dyzenhaus wishes to establish as the American
Schmitt.
Since Dyzenhaus freely acknowledges that his account of
the two Holmes' incorporates Professor Horwitz's treatment of
Holmes in his recent history of modern American legal
thought,' a brief recounting of Horwitz's arguments in support of this account is required. According to Horwitz, the early
Holmes was consumed by the effort to develop a unified theory
of civil and criminal liability. That theory was designed to
provide an account of law that steered between two traditional,
yet unpalatable extremes in American jurisprudence." On
the one hand stood the natural rights tradition, which fused
law and morality, and conceived of civil and criminal liability
in punitive terms, as a sanction for defendants who have acted
in an immoral and subjectively blameworthy fashion. This account of law troubled Holmes because he believed that moral
standards of blameworthiness are inherently vague, and thus
rendered liability inexact and unpredictable (and unfair and
inefficient), particularly when judgments of blameworthiness
are left to mercurial juries.' On the other hand stood utilitarian positivist theories of law, under which civil and criminal
liability is conceived as a form of regulation; a mechanism by
which the government can promote through sanctions certain
'

Dyzenhaus, supra note 6, at 177.

*" Dyzenhaus, supra note 6, at 177-78.
...HORWITZ, supra note 25.
14
14

HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 112.
HORW1TZ, supra note 25, at 112-13.
HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 116.

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 63: 225

desired policy ends, such as economic growth. Holmes found
this theory politically unacceptable in that it appeared to sanction legislative supremacy, and with it, ill-conceived populist
measures to redistribute wealth from the rich few to the poor
masses through, for example, the imposition of statutory compensation schemes.'45
The Common Law was, on this account, designed to provide a theory of law and liability that mediated between these
two extremes. By endorsing the objective fault (reasonable
person) theory of liability for both civil and criminal law,
Holmes incorporated an average or intersubjective standard,
thereby avoiding the arbitrary and unpredictable moralism of
natural rights theory. By retaining the notion of fault as an
autonomous common law legal doctrine, Holmes avoided ceding
to legislatures the competence to determine liability. The progressive common law judge, the intelligent, incremental innovator, thus emerges as the moderate hero of the early Holmes's
theory of law. 4 '
Holmes's solution, of course, worked only if one was prepared to accept the concept of objective fault-a concept which
Holmes intended to be both shared, public and accessible (at
least to good judges)-yet distinctly legal and apolitical. Its
acceptance in turn presupposed the existence of nebulous but
nevertheless judicially discernible customary norms of reasonableness. "For Holmes, some conception of the 'average,' the
'normal'--in short, some conception of custom lay in the background of his early thought."'47 The linchpin of the early
Holmes's defense of common law adjudication was thus the notion that Americans shared some core beliefs about what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable conduct. In the absence of
customary or shared norms, the Holmesian solution collapses
and law must return to one of the two poles of natural rights
or positivism.
The transition from the early to the late Holmes (and from
pre-modernity to modernity) is marked by just this collapse.
According to Horwitz, by 1897, amid "Itihe radical social and
economic conflicts of the 1890s," Holmes could no longer en-

1,5

HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 124.

"'
1,7

HORWrrZ, supra note 25, at 124-25.
HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 136.
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dorse the notion of shared customary norms.'" Indeed, by the
time he wr'te The Path of the Law, Holmes could only conceive
of society, as did Schmitt, as a locus of competing political
groups and classes. "With the collapse of a customary theory of
law amid social and economic struggle," Holmes converted to
positivism.149 He conceded that law was policy, and that
"[plolicy was... a coercive imposition of the state." ' There
being no agreed-upon moral principles or values, law for the
later Holmes could only be the coerced resolution of conflict-the imposition of order on terms set by the sovereign,
which in the case of American democracy, happened to be the
legislature. Thus, as Horwitz reads it, Holmes's dissent in
Lochner v. New York' flows logically from his mature, skeptical positivism. "If law is merely politics, then the legislature
should in fact decide. If law is merely a battleground over
which social interests clash, then the legislature is the appropriate institution for weighing and measuring competing interests.' 5 2
In Horwitz's account of the later Holmes, Dyzenhaus finds
all the attributes of Schmitt. The later Holmes, as much as
Schmitt, lived in a nihilistic universe in which no conception of
goodness or fairness could be rationally advanced over another,
and which posed the specter of perpetual conflict and the
threat of social disintegration. In the absence of accepted notions of good or right, the only faith to which Holmes could
subscribe was the artificial faith of the sovereign; the later
Holmes worshipped nothing more than the sovereign's power
to impose order, to shape society on its terms. 0
Dyzenhaus admits that Holmes never pined for Schmitt's
fascist dystopia; however, this merely indicates that American
society had never approached the degree of disintegration
Schmitt had seen in Weimar, and thus never prompted Holmes
to consider the steps that might be necessary to maintain the
very possibility of sovereign-imposed order.' Instead, given
" HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 138.
..HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 140.
HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 137.
151 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
15 HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 142.
15 Dyzenhaus, supra note 6, at 179.
..Dyzenhaus, supra note 6, at 185.
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the relative stability of American democratic political institutions, Holmes could afford to endorse a skeptical form of
majoritarianism. In the absence of agreement about the good,
it would be determined by the majority, not because of some
normative theory justifying majority rule as good or fair, but
simply because acceptance of majoritarianism would perpetuate order. This, says Dyzenhaus, is the political theory of The
Path of the Law and the Lochner dissent:
[J]udges should defer to the will of the people as expressed by the
legislature. Th[is] is not because Holmes is a democrat by conviction.
Rather it is because, in the absence of any principled way of settling

the political and social conflicts that enter into the province of the
judiciary, security and stability are best served by taking the

people's will as moral.155

Thus, "[Holmes's] basic attitude to the law was one which

could be mapped in all important respects onto
Schmitt's...."15 ' For Holmes as for Schmitt, "the realm of
the normative
is exhausted by the values of order and stabili57
ty.1'

2. Holmes's Modest Skepticism
The critical question for Holmes scholarship raised by
Horwitz's and Dyzenhaus's analysis is thus a perennial one:
what manner of skepticism does one encounter in Holmes? Is it
the cynical statism of Schmitt or a more modest skepticism
within the liberal tradition? Because The Common Law adopts
a relatively mild political tone, this question, as Horwitz's
analysis makes clear, is closely tied to the question of whether
The Path of the Law should be read as a significant departure
from Holmes's earlier work.
As just described, Horwitz and Dyzenhaus posit a
Holmesian transformation-"an astonishing intellectual
leap"--from The Common Law to The Path of the Law.'58 In
fact, their reading is not borne out by the language and sentiments of the two texts, nor by other of Holmes's writings. In-

*5 Dyzenhaus, supra note 6, at 178.
157

Dyzenhaus, supra note 6, at 185.
Dyzenhaus, supra note 6, at 179.

15

HORWITZ, supra note 25, at 143 & n*.

15
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deed, as I will argue in this subsection, Holmes's work is far
more impressive for its continuous advocation of modestly
skeptical liberalism than for its discontinuities.'"
Horwitz relies heavily on the following passage from The
Path of the Law as indicative of the later Holmes's darker,
modernist skepticism.
The logical method and form flatter the longing for certainty and for
repose which is in every human mind. But certainty generally is
illusion, and repose is not the destiny of man. Behind the logical
form lies a judgment as to the relative worth and importance of
competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and unconscious
judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole
proceedings."w

According to Horwitz, "[w]hile Holmes's criticism of formalism
is not new, his association of logic with a 'longing for certainty
and repose' is."'6' The suggestion is that the later Holmes appreciated, as the earlier did not, that a belief in the ability of
reason to resolve legal and moral disputes indicates a primitive
or immature psychological need for certainty, when in fact
there is none to be had.
As the remainder of the paragraph not quoted by Horwitz
makes clear, there is nothing at all new in this passage." It
expresses not radical skepticism, but the same modestly skeptical historicism-the idea that reason and logic operate within
historically contingent and disparate conceptual paradigms or
frameworks-that is at the heart of The Common Law.
You can give any conclusion a logical form. You always can imply a
condition in a contract. But why do you imply it? It is because of
some belief as to the practice of the community or of a class, or because of some opinion as to policy, or, in short, because of some
attitude of yours upon a matter not capable of exact quantitative
measurement, and therefore not capable of founding exact logical
conclusions. Such matters really are battle grounds where the
means do not exist for determinations that shall be good for all time,

9 See RICHARD A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW 283 (1995) (The continuity of
Holmes's thought is more remarkable than its eddies.").
" HORWrrz, supra note 25, at 141 (quoting Holmes, Path, supra note 5, at
466).
11 HORWIMz, supra note 25, at 141.
16 Cf. POSNER, supra note 159, at 277 ("Beware a Horwitz bearing ellipses.")
(citation omitted). Judge Posner suggests that Horwitz also misreads the implications of this passage for contract law. POSNER, supra note 159, at 275-77.
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and where the decision can do no more than embody the preference
of a given body in a given time and place. We do not realize how
large a part of our law is open to reconsideration upon a slight
change in the habit of the public mind. No concrete proposition is
self-evident, no matter how ready we may be to accept it, not even
Mr. Herbert Spencer's Every man has a right to do what he wills,
provided he interferes not with a like right on the part of his neighbors.1"

This is vintage, skeptical Holmes. It is not, however, nihilism.
Indeed, one can only read strong skepticism into this passage
by reading its most skeptical sentences and clauses ("[ylou can
give any conclusion a logical form"; questions of policy are "battle grounds") while ignoring the not-strongly skeptical conclusions which Holmes reaches (no claims are capable of "exact
quantitative measurement"; no proposition is "good for all
time" or "self-evident"; the validity of claims depends in part
on the attitudes and beliefs accepted by the "public mind").
Holmes does not deny that legal or moral conclusions can be
justified, only that this justification can take the form of
transhistorical, transcultural or mathematical demonstration.
Indeed, Holmes's final point-that even a principle which his
fellow Americans accept as obviously true, namely, Spencer's
rendition of Mill's harm principle, is not deducible from selfevident premises-presupposes that his audience is likely to
mistake its collective belief that the principle is justified with
the notion that all peoples in all situations will similarly conclude that it is justified.
Horwitz also argues that The Path of the Law marks the
"daring[ I] and original[ ]" presentation of the prediction theory
of law.' In fact, however, the prediction theory was always
an integral part of Holmes's account of customary common law.
As early as 1872, Holmes wrote that "ina civilized state it is
not the will of the sovereign that makes lawyers' law, even
when that is its source, but what a body of subjects, namely,
the judges, by whom it is enforced, say is his will."16 Law is
already conceived as judge-made, and thus the critical issue for
lawyers and citizens is to know what, in fact, the courts do.

Holmes, Path, supra note 5, at 466.
HORWlTz, supra note 25, at 140.
15 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Book Notice, 6 AM. L. REV. 723, 724 (1872) (emphasis in original).
'6
'"
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Crucially, prediction is not derived from knowledge of the individual judge and his personal preferences. Prediction is only
possible because there exist objective and determinate sources
of law, including precedent and social custom, upon which
judges conventionally rely.
The only question for the lawyer is, how will the judges act? Any
motive for their action, be it constitution, statute, custom, or precedent, which can be relied upon as likely in the generality of cases to
prevail, is worthy of consideration as one of the sources of law, in a
treatise on jurisprudence. Singular motives, like the blandishments
of the emperor's wife, are not a ground of prediction, and are therefore not considered. 1"

Thus, when it first appears in Holmes's thought, the prediction
theory of law is part and parcel of a model of law and adjudication that treats legal reasoning as potentially rational and
partly determinate. In its later invocation in The Path of the
Law there is no suggestion that these ideas have somehow
been decoupled. Indeed, that essay's concluding defense of
"jurisprudence"-the study of law's general principles-presupposes that some form of objective legal reasoning
is possible: "If a man goes into law it pays to be a master of it,
and to be a master of it means to look straight through all the
dramatic
incidents and to discern the true basis for prophe167
cy."

The Path of the Law contains other textual embarrassments to Horwitz's thesis. His entire account is premised on
the notion that Holmes ultimately recognized the futility of the
objective fault theory of liability which formed the preoccupation of his pre-skeptical common law days. Yet Holmes continued to endorse and advocate this theory in The Path of the
Law and later essays, not to mention in subsequent judicial
decisions." Likewise, Horwitz finds within Holmes's mention
Iss Id.

Holmes, Path, supra note 5, at 475.
See Baltimore & Ohio RPR Co. v. Goodman, 275
common law rule for determining negligent driving at
Path, supra note 5, at 471 (asserting as the general
infliction of temporal damage by a responsible person
which a person of common experience would know
'

US. 66 (1927) (establishing
railroad crosmings); Holmes,
theory of tort liability the
acting under circumstances
to pose a danger of such

harm); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L.

443, 450-51 (1899) (predicting imminent acceptance of general theory of tort
liability based on unified principle of objective fault).
REV.
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of the future "man of statistics and master of economics" a
statement of extreme moral skepticism. Yet, it reads as a pragmatic statement about the need for intelligent reasoning about
means and ends: "we are called upon to consider and weigh the
ends of legislation, the means of attaining them, and the
169

cost."

There is, in sum, little if any textual support in The Path
of the Law for the "two Holmes" thesis and the claim that
Holmes was a profound skeptic about legal or moral justification. This does not mean that Holmes was not skeptical about
some things. It is clear from the long passage quoted above
that Holmes was very skeptical of transcendental arguments
that attempt to establish propositions as "self-evident" or valid
for "all time."70 In modern parlance, Holmes was an
antifoundationalist."' And, as modern antifoundationalists
such as Richard Posner and Richard Rorty like to remind us,
there is no reason to associate antifoundationalism with thoroughgoing or illiberal moral skepticism. Certainly, there is no
basis for finding such an association in the work of Holmes.
Although the proper account of the relationship between
Holmes's skepticism and his liberalism requires more elaboration than can be given here, I can begin to articulate it by
providing a brief analysis of Holmes's justification for the common law system of tort liability. In The Common Law, Holmes
says the following:
[Tihe general purpose of the law of torts is to secure a man indemnity against certain forms of harm to person, reputation, or estate, at

the hands of his neighbors, not because they are wrong, but because
they are harms .... It is [thus] intended to reconcile the policy of
letting accidents lie where they fall, and the reasonable freedom of
others with the protection of the individual from injury."'
...
Holmes, Path, supra note 5, at 474 (emphasis added). Professor Grey argues
that Horwitz's treatment of Holmes also errs in reading the early, academic
Holmes as a proponent of judicial innovation and then contrasting the later Judge
and Justice Holmes as a conservative formalist. According to Grey, Holmes consistently maintained that significant legal innovation properly ought to occur through
legislation. See Thomas C. Grey, Molecular Motions: The Holmesian Judge in Theo-

ry and Practice, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 19, 28, 32 (1995). While Grey is no
doubt correct that Horwitz's contrast is overstated, Grey himself may overstate
Holmes's commitment to judicial deference.
.70See supra text accompanying note 163.
171 See Thomas C. Grey, Holmes and Legal Pragmatism, 41 STAN. L. REV. 787,

799-804 (1989).
'72

OLIVER WENDELL HOLIES, JR., THE COMMON LAW

144 (43d prtg. 1949)

1997]

STYLE AND SKEPTICISM

Notice that, even here, Holmes evinces a kind of moral skepticism. Tort law, he says, is unconcerned with morality; it imposes liability for certain acts not because they constitute
"wrongs," but because they generate "harms." If Horwitz and
Dyzenhaus are prepared to read strong moral skepticism into
The Path of the Law, they should be equally prepared to find
that disposition in this earlier passage. Yet such a reading
would err in failing to appreciate Holmes's particular understanding and usage of terms like "wrong" and "policy." I will
first address the former.
Holmes famously tended to equate moral wrongs with
"culpable" acts.' He defined culpable acts as those acts undertaken by persons out of a desire to injure others or with
actual indifference to the physical well-being of others; they
are the acts of wicked or depraved individuals, people with bad
hearts. 4 As such, Holmesian moral wrongs are akin to mala
in se: they constitute conduct by persons who flout basic, primitive standards of human decency or morality. Actors who
commit them are deserving of punishment commensurate with
their moral "guilt."175
In his early academic writings, Holmes seems to have
drawn a link between morally culpable misconduct and the
criminal law, and to have distinguished criminal and civil law
on that basis. Victims of culpable conduct had lost their right
to seek private vengeance. Nevertheless, they could look to the
State to avenge wicked acts on their behalf through punitive
criminal sanctions. 76 Criminal law, on this account, is fundamentally concerned with the actual culpability of the accused-whether he or she acted with wrongful intent or indifference. Civil law, by contrast, does not sanction conduct because it evidences moral guilt (although it may sanction con-

(1881) [hereinafter HOI MS, COMION LAW].

17 See, e.g., Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Theory of Torts, 7 AM. L REV.
652, 653 (1873).
17

Holmes, supra note 173, at 652-53; see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,

Trespass and Negligence, 14 AiLL L. REV. 1, 23 (1880) (describing immoral conduct

as the conduct of one with a 'bad... heart).
1

Holmes, supra note 173, at 652.

1 See Holmes, supra note 173, at 652; see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.,
Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 A. L. REV. 1, 6 (1870) (discussing
modem displacement of private power to punish criminal conduct).
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duct which in fact turns out to be morally wrong), but instead
sanctions conduct simply because it causes harm. Civil damages are for this reason almost always compensatory: whereas
criminal law is concerned with enforcing genuine duties to refrain from immoral acts, civil law is a form of regulation or
taxation-the state gives one the option to refrain from conduct that turns out to be harmful or to pay for the harm.1"
A crucial moment in the development of Holmes's thought
occurred in the period leading up to the publication of The
Common Law. For it apparently was in this period that he
rejected the distinctions just drawn between criminal and civil
law, and with them, the notion that any part of law--civil or
criminal-corresponds to natural standards of morality. Formal notice of this change is given in Lecture II of The Common
Law, which pronounces as mistaken any attempt to link criminal sanctions to the moral culpability of the offender. These
sanctions must instead be understood as a regulatory device by
which the State may deter certain forms of harm-generating
conduct." Accordingly, a criminal law prohibiting murder is
not ultimately interested in the accused's intent. Rather, it
sanctions a conviction if it is proven that the accused failed to
take reasonable
steps to avoid a foreseeable serious harm or
9
death.

7

The change in Holmes's treatment of criminal law thus
would seem to indicate that Holmes had become a positivist by
1881 rather than 1897. The Common Law fully endorses, at
least as a description of modern legal systems, the positivist
notions that law is the product of contingent acts of institutions with law-making authority, and that no part of modern
law necessarily correlates to notions of natural morality.
Holmes, moreover, apparently came to endorse this positivist
account of modern law in part out of skepticism about the
existence of natural wrongs or inherently wicked acts. It is because there are no such things, or at least no agreed-upon

177 Holmes, supra note 165, at 725 ("liability to a civil action is not a penalty
or sanction of itself creating a duty," thus, "it does not necessarily imply culpability, or a breach of duty, as Austin thought, who looked at the law too much as a
criminal lawyer").
1' HOLMES, COMION LAW, supra note 172, at 37-38, 46.

.7.HOLMES, COMION LAW, supra note 172, at 53-54, 75.
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ways of conclusively determining and defining them, that
Holmes is prepared to divorce even criminal law from morality.
Yet, in contrast to the strong skepticism described by
Horwitz and Dyzenhaus, the skepticism I have described is of
a limited nature. When Holmes says that criminal and civil
law violations are not sanctioned as "wrongs," he is claiming
only that these acts are sanctioned regardless of whether we
agree that they constitute acts violating natural, universal
moral commands. This proposition hardly entails the embrace
of moral nihilism, nor does it entail accepting that law has no
purpose other than that of advancing the will of the majority
or the stability of society.
In fact, the language of the above-quoted passage from The
Common Law on the purpose of tort law suggests the con8 0 Like
trary."
much of The Path of Law, it begins with seemingly skeptical sentiments (tort law is about remedying harms
not wrongs), only to conclude with an unabashedly normative
argument. In this case, the argument is that the common law
of torts, by adopting a uniform standard of objective negligence, expresses and to a certain degree enforces a commitment to liberty. Our society, the passage suggests, holds as one
of its constitutive principles that individuals' lives are not
inherently bound up with others'; people are to a large extent
free to pursue their own well-being and to disavow responsibility for the well-being of others. This freedom, however, must be
constrained (to an extent compatible with maintaining that
freedom) for the obvious reason that its exercise has consequences for others; it can significantly inhibit or destroy others'
freedom by damaging their physical integrity and property.
Tort law instructs us to take precautions against interfering
with others' security, or to indemnify (in theory, to restore)
those who suffer injury as a consequence of the exercise of our
liberty. In other words, modern tort law is founded on a commitment to a relatively wide distribution of some security, and
therefore liberty. At the same time, it respects the very liberty
it protects by limiting liability to those harms that might have
been avoided with a reasonable amount of foresight and ef181
fort.
See supra text accompanying note 172.

. This is not to say that the distribution of liberty will be equal. In particular,
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Notwithstanding his moral skepticism, Holmes thus appears to have defended the objective fault standard in tort law
on the moral ground that it respects and perhaps promotes
liberal political principles. It is true that Holmes rarely made
reference to a "principle" of liberty. 182 Again, however, we
must be careful to avoid a misreading of Holmesian usage. To
the extent Holmes avoided the rhetoric of principle, he did so
because he believed that it inevitably carried false connotations of foundationalism and the existence of a transcendental
moral order. He thus preferred to make the case for liberty in
terms that he hoped would be philosophically deflationary.
Liberty, he might say, is "sound policy":1" it is a belief with
no celestial warrant, yet one which Holmes and his fellow
citizens believed was justified and to which they were strongly
committed. Tort law founded on the objective fault principle is
justified in part because it expresses and is compatible with a
traditional, fundamental value shared by people living in modern, liberal, capitalist society. Thus, Holmes maintained that,
even if there is no necessary connection between positive law
and morality, law could and should correspond to certain normative principles endorsed in the "public mind.""84
On this brief reconstruction, Holmes's positivism flowed
from only a moderate moral skepticism. As such, it is not vulnerable to the anti-positivist critique advanced by Fuller, Cover and Dyzenhaus. Indeed, if it is fair to conclude that Holmes
the judge followed Holmesian theory, we have clear evidence
that his theory did not generate the statist theory of adjudication that Dyzenhaus attributes to him. The judge, as much as
the theorist, consistently claimed that judges faced with questions of statutory interpretation retained discretion to "make"
law.'85 Even Holmes's Lochner dissent-interpreted by

some members of the community-Holmes famously posits the congenitally clumsy-will have their liberty severely curtailed so that a relatively wide distribution

of liberty can be achieved. HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 172, at 108.
12 But see, e.g., HOLMES, COMON LAW, supra note 172, at 96 (general adoption

of strict liability would constitute unjust infringement on liberty).
183 HOLMES, COMMON LAW, supra note 172, at 50.
184
185

See supra text accompanying note 163.
Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1916) (Holmes, J., dis-

senting) ("judges do and must legislate" in the interpretation of statutes); Northern
Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 401 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(urging that statutes be read "intelligently"); Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The The.
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Horwitz and Dyzenhaus to stand for an unflinching judicial
deference to legislative power-offers little support for the
anti-positivist position. In reality, the opinion urges courts to
exhibit caution in deciding cases from the "top down," on the
basis of a comprehensive theory of justice they purport to find
in the Constitution, particularly when the theory in question is
not easily reconciled with data provided by relevant precedent.' The Lochner dissent, like the rest of Holmes's writings, is not the work of a militant statist, but that of a moderate skeptic and political liberal."
E. Postscript:Continuing the Search
If Professor Dyzenhaus is to extend his attack on strongly
skeptical positivism beyond Schmittian fascism, he must look
beyond Holmes. As long as he continues to search within the
relatively liberal traditions of Anglo-American legal theory, he
may find this search frustrating."cs Even if an Anglo-American Schmitt were discovered, what I hope to have shown here
is that the existence of such a theorist would not support a
general indictment of positivism or even strongly skeptical
positivism per se. At most, it would provide evidence of an
ory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 417-18 (1899) (rejecting
intentionalism in textual interpretation).
" See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76-77 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(majority decides on "an economic theory"; 'Fourteenth Amendment does not enact
Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics"; "a Constitution is not intended to embody a
particular economic theory"; "General propositions do not decide concrete cases";
majority's theory irreconcilable with recent decisions).
'" For a similar reading, see Robert Brauneis, "The Foundation of Our TRegula.
•
The Myth and Meaning of Justice Holmes's Opinion
tory Takings' Jurisprudence".
in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 106 YALE. L. J. 613, 643-44 (1996).
" The more radical skepticism of Schmitt (without the fascistic political commitments) can perhaps be found in some of the writings of Judges Robert Bork
and Learned Hand. See David AJ.Richards, Originalism Without Foundations,65
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1373, 1376-79, 1388-97 (1990) (reviewing ROBErr BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AIERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990)) (arguing
that Bork accepts extreme moral skepticism and deduces from this skepticism that
the current majority of Americans may enforce through positive legislation any
measures on which they can agree, but acknowledging that Bork believes these
claims are compatible with the notion that judges may invoke liberty-protecting
constitutional provisions as a basis for limiting the power of current majorities);
Richard A. Posner, The Learned Hand Biography and the Question of Judicial
Greatness, 104 YALE L.J. 511, 531 (1994) (Hand "may have been a full-fledged,
out-and-out skeptic when it came to morality").
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empirical association between strong moral skepticism, positiv-

ism, an authoritarian account of law, and a correspondingly
passive account of adjudication.
CONCLUSION

Professor Dyzenhaus's paper provides a thoughtful and
thought-provoking, but ultimately unpersuasive, attempt to
attribute radical skepticism and antiliberalism to The Path of
the Law. In so doing, it also provides an interesting perspective
on Neil Duxbury's observation that the essay's influence is in
part attributable to the style in which it was written. That
Holmes wrote about law, adjudication, morality, and liberty in
vibrant, engaging and elliptical prose does indeed help to explain why The Path of the Law continues to receive scholarly
attention more than a century after its publication. But these
very attributes also seem to have left Holmes, and his greatest
essay, unusually vulnerable to underestimation and
misattribution. In this respect, at least, the style of The Path
of the Law has disserved its substance.

